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Dron’t Stop Me Now:1  Prioritizing Drone Journalism in 
Commercial Drone Regulation 
David A. Fischer* 
INTRODUCTION 
New technologies that simplify lives and improve our understanding of the world 
around us inevitably pose new, difficult legal questions.  This maxim is true for 
commercial drones.2  The recent proliferation of these devices creates a multitude of 
opportunities for commercial use.3  To borrow a phrase from Justice Robert H. 
Jackson, the ability of drones to navigate the sky like “vagrant clouds”4 also means 
that these devices pose significant regulatory challenges for federal, state, and local 
governments.  Governments attempting to address the safety, privacy, and region-
specific concerns raised by increased commercial drone use must also consider the 
 
 1. Unlike Mister Fahrenheit of Queen’s hit song “Don’t Stop Me Now,” drones are not capable of 
light-speed travel.  See QUEEN, Don’t Stop Me Now, on JAZZ (Elektra Records 1978); see also 14 C.F.R. 
§ 107.51(a) (2019) (capping maximum commercial drone speed at 100 miles per hour, subject to waiver 
by 14 C.F.R. § 107.205). 
 * J.D. Candidate, Columbia Law School, Class of 2020; B.A., Cornell University, Class of 2015. 
2019–2020 Executive Notes Editor of the Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts.  My most sincere thanks 
to Caroline DeCell for her insight, support, and engaged supervision of this project.  Thanks also to the 
staff of the Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts for their help in refining and polishing this Note.  Finally, 
thank you to my family and friends for their love and support through the rigors of law school. 
 2.  This Note uses “drone” to refer to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) rather than unmanned 
aircraft vehicles (UAV).  At its most basic, a UAS is comprised of a UAV (what a lay viewer might refer 
to as a “drone”), an operator located on the ground, and a communication system that relays commands 
from the user to the vehicle.  See, e.g., FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 § 341, 49 U.S.C.A. § 44801(12) 
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No.116-65).  Additionally, unless otherwise indicated, this Note uses “drone” 
to refer to “small” UAS, which Congress defines as UAS weighing “less than 55 pounds, including the 
weight of anything attached to or carried by the aircraft.”  § 44801(9) (Westlaw).  FAA’s commercial 
drone regulations do not currently apply to drones that weigh more than 55 pounds, and pilots wishing to 
fly those drones must apply for a specific exemption under the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.  See 
§ 44807 (Westlaw).  
 3. See Gartner Says Almost 3 Million Personal and Commercial Drones Will Be Shipped in 2017, 
GARTNER (Feb. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/6VJF-S5QD.  One projection set the global market opportunity 
for the drone industry at $100 billion by 2020, with seventy percent for military use, seventeen percent 
for civil government and commercial use, and thirteen percent for consumer use.  Drones: Reporting for 
Work, GOLDMAN SACHS (Oct. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/K6NY-X9GN.  Military, consumer (other than 
for journalism), and civil government uses are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 4. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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concomitant burdens placed on commercial drone use. 
This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part I highlights novel journalistic uses of 
drones for content production and investigative reporting and discusses the pitfalls 
of under- or overregulating commercial drones.  Part II details the current state of 
federal, state, and local regulation of commercial drone use.  Keeping in mind 
potential changes that may result to the FAA’s Part 107 commercial drone 
regulations from the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, this Note considers the 
FAA’s current regulations as a baseline for whether new regulations would help or 
hinder drone journalism.  The state and local picture is more intricate, and this Note 
discusses those regulations in three parts:  safety regulations, privacy regulations, 
and region-specific regulations.  Part III discusses federal safety regulations and the 
First Amendment and proposes simplifying the regulatory picture by preempting 
most state and local safety regulations.  Part IV examines whether the federal 
regulatory scheme preempts state and local privacy regulations and common law 
torts, the application of those common law torts, and First Amendment limitations 
on state and local privacy regulations.  The Conclusion details how an aspiring drone 
journalist would experience the regulatory scheme proposed herein. 
I. DRONES FOR CONTENT PRODUCTION AND INVESTIGATIVE 
REPORTING 
Cutting-edge journalists may use drones to investigate stories and to produce 
engaging content.  In other words, drones enable journalists to see where they 
otherwise cannot and tell stories in new ways.  Drones can be valuable newsgathering 
tools, facilitating safer and more cost-effective access to unique perspectives.5  While 
even the most ardent boosters of drone journalism do not contend that drones will 
imminently take the place of comparable technologies like helicopters,6 regulators 
with their eyes on the sky would be mistaken to ignore the implications for their 
favorite newspaper, smartphone app, or cable news channel. 
News outlets and reporters already use commercial drones for investigation and 
content production.  For example, journalists used drones as an investigatory tool to 
view migrant detention camps on the United States-Mexico border after the Trump 
administration restricted access to the facilities.7  The footage, filmed by a freelance 
cameraman working for BBC News, depicted children being marched between a 
corridor of tents at a camp in Tornillo, Texas.8  In another example, CNN used a 
drone to capture footage of the crumbling, desert ruins of the “ghost town” of 
 
 5. Cynthia D. Love, Sean T. Lawson & Avery E. Holton, News from Above: First Amendment 
Implications of the Federal Aviation Administration Ban on Commercial Drones, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 
L. 22, 28–33 (2015), https://perma.cc/G4AK-ZYYJ. 
 6. See #083 – CNN AIR with Greg Agvent, COMMERCIAL DRONES FM (Dec. 18, 2018), https://
perma.cc/97GS-HLVW.  
 7. Matt Novak, Journalists Start Using Drones to View Immigrant Detention Camps After 
Government Blocks Entry, GIZMODO (June 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/UBU5-HFUS.  
 8. Aleem Maqbool (@AleemMaqbool), TWITTER (Jun. 22, 2018, 12:25 AM), https://perma.cc/
V8G8-AS94; Aleem Maqbool (@AleemMaqbool), TWITTER (Jun. 21, 2018, 11:40 PM), https://perma.cc/
BPH6-V926.  
FISCHER, PRIORITIZING JOURNALISM IN COMMERCIAL DRONE REGULATION, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 107 (2019) 
2019] PRIORITIZING JOURNALISM IN COMMERCIAL DRONE REGULATION 109 
Metropolis, Nevada.9  In that footage, a drone flies through an arch in what must 
have been Metropolis’s city square while scanning the desert that surrounds the 
ruins.10  Moreover, in an empirical study of drone uses supporting journalists, the 
only potential uses that ranked higher than investigative reporting were uses of 
drones to cover environmental stories (such as rising sea levels) and outdoor stories 
(like the best places to rock climb).11 
In addition to these investigative uses, journalists use drones to produce 
compelling content.  Many of these visuals depict environmental stories, such as slow 
transformations wrought by climate change or rapid impacts caused by disasters.  
The New York Times published photos and videos online of China’s expanding 
deserts, shrinking oases, and displaced people.12  The Times also depicted the second-
largest lake in Bolivia drying up and the surrounding fishing villages reinventing 
themselves.13  60 Minutes photographer Danny Cooke used a drone to explore the 
ruins of Chernobyl and the nearby Ukrainian city of Pripyat.14  Closer to home, 
ProPublica and the Charleston Gazette-Mail documented the natural devastation that 
energy companies owning mineral rights caused to the homes above natural 
resources in West Virginia.15  Journalists also used drones to capture images of recent 
wildfires in California.16  Finally, journalists use drones to record protests, marches, 
and other forms of activism.17  These content production and investigative reporting 
examples demonstrate the value of drone journalism. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) projects at minimum a four-fold 
increase in registered commercial drones by the end of 2022 and estimates that 
currently forty-eight percent of commercial drones are primarily used for “aerial 
imaging and data collection, including real estate photography.”18  Goldman Sachs 
projects a $480 million market for drones used for journalism.19  With the expanding 
 
 9. Lilit Marcus & Effie Nidam, See a Nevada Ghost Town from the Sky, CNN TRAVEL (Jan. 3, 
2019), https://perma.cc/M33P-GHWN.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Kathleen Bartzen Culver & Megan Duncan, Drones in the News: Journalist Conceptions and 
Public Engagement, CTR. FOR JOURNALISM ETHICS, UNIV. OF WIS.–MADISON 11 (July 16, 2018), https:/
/perma.cc/BHL6-PQLU. 
 12. Josh Haner, Edward Wong, Derek Watkins & Jeremy White, Living in China’s Expanding 
Deserts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/E5JG-DJZ9. 
 13. Nicholas Casey & Josh Haner, Climate Change Claims a Lake, and an Identity, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/B4FS-2EK7.  
 14. Emanuella Grinberg, Drone Footage Shows Derelict Remains of Chernobyl and City of Pripyat, 
CNN (Dec. 1, 2014), https://perma.cc/9YEU-R55J; see also Danny Cooke, Postcards from Pripyat, 
Chernobyl, VIMEO (Nov. 24, 2014, 4:11 AM), https://perma.cc/9YEU-R55J. 
 15. Ken Ward Jr., Al Shaw & Mayeta Clark, Powerless: What It Looks and Sounds Like When a 
Gas Driller Overruns Your Land, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/3R6Q-Z4EP.  
 16. See, e.g., Joseph Serna, Devastating Drone Images Show Neighborhood Hit by Shasta County 
Fire, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2018, 2:40 PM), https://perma.cc/RK56-T3R2.  
 17. See, e.g., CNN AIR (@CNN_AIR), TWITTER (Jan. 19, 2019, 7:33 PM), https://perma.cc/
GR4A-QT3M; CNN AIR (@CNN_AIR), TWITTER (Dec. 31, 2018, 11:21 AM), https://perma.cc/3VV3-
4RM2.  
 18. FAA projects an increase from the 110,604 registered commercial drones at the end of 2017 to 
a range of 451,800 to 717,895 by the end of 2022.  FAA Aerospace Forecast: Fiscal Years 2018–2038, 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 42–43 (Mar. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/6GDN-GXKS. 
 19. Drones: Reporting for Work, supra note 3.  Of course, this pales in comparison to the $100 
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use of commercial drones, federal, state, and local governments have legitimate 
regulatory interests in protecting the safety and privacy of their citizens.  However, 
a drone journalist must currently contend with a conflicting mass of federal, state, 
and local laws that sometimes contradict each other and make drone journalism more 
expensive through increased compliance costs.20  Aviation lawyer and former FAA 
official Loretta Alkalay has joked:  “I’m a lawyer, and I can’t figure out what the 
laws are in a lot of places[.]”21  Drone laws confuse even those tasked with enforcing 
them.  After a deadly mass shooting in Las Vegas, state police arrested and charged 
with a misdemeanor a drone pilot who was taking pictures of the shooter’s home, 
only to drop the charges because the officers misinterpreted Nevada drone laws.22  
This Note proposes that simplifying the federal, state, and local regulatory patchwork 
would better accommodate journalists. 
Additionally, this Note considers how to tailor regulations to avoid under- or 
overregulation of commercial drones, bearing in mind legitimate regulatory goals.  
Two examples of under- and overregulation of safety interests come to mind. 
A recent incident at the United Kingdom’s Gatwick Airport illustrates 
underregulation in action.  During the peak winter holiday travel week, a rogue pair 
of drones grounded all flights at Gatwick.23  On December 20, 2018, the rogue drones 
shut down Gatwick for over twenty-four hours, causing disruptions to at least 800 
flights and sending ripple effects throughout Europe, affecting “upward of 100,000 
travelers[.]”24  After all, drones can pose serious safety risks to airplanes.25  While 
travelers were understandably chagrined about the extensive delays, the disruptions 
were likely justified given the potential harm.  Although British law makes it a 
criminal violation, subject to five years in prison, to fly a drone within a kilometer of 
an airport, drone owners did not need to register with the United Kingdom’s Civil 
Aviation Authority at the time of the Gatwick incident.26  A registration requirement 
may have mitigated some of the extended damage that the drones inflicted upon 
Gatwick’s travel schedule.  Comparatively, the FAA requires registration of all 
drones and requires operators to display the registration number on the exterior of 
 
billion market opportunity for national security drones or to the total market for commercial and civil 
government use:  $13 billion.  Id. 
 20. See Clay Calvert, Charles D. Tobin & Matthew D. Bunker, Newsgathering Takes Flight in 
Choppy Skies: Legal Obstacles Affecting Journalistic Drone Use, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 535, 549–51 (2016).  Cf. Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private 
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1296–99 (1981).  For the purposes of this Note, I assume that costs of 
compliance with federal, state, and local commercial drone regulations are significant and may deter 
journalists from starting to use drones.  Any empirical analysis of these costs is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
 21. Travis Fox, Drone Journalism’s Battle for Airspace, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 9, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/WN59-RFUK.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Benjamin Mueller & Amie Tsang, Gatwick Airport Shut Down by ‘Deliberate’ Drone 
Incursions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/9DQG-PTUC.  
 24. Id. 
 25. See Avery Thompson, Here’s What a Drone Collision Would Do To an Airplane Wing, 
POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/KUQ5-HKPY.  
 26. Mueller & Tsang, supra note 23. 
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the drone.27  This display provides for ready identification, and the lack of anonymity 
might have deterred the Gatwick drone operators from flying in the first place.  The 
drone problem was eventually resolved in the early hours of December 21, when the 
British Army reportedly brought military-grade equipment that could jam the drones’ 
radio signals, thus grounding the drones.28 
Regulators should also avoid overregulation, lest they criminalize drone 
journalism or run afoul of the First Amendment through deploying pretextual 
criminal sanctions.  On October 27, 2017, Myanmar detained Lau Hon Meng and 
Mok Choy Lin, two reporters working on a documentary for the Turkish state 
broadcaster, TRT World, as well as their interpreter Aung Naing Soe and driver Hla 
Tin, for “attempting to fly a drone near parliament” in the Myanmar capital.29  They 
were sentenced to two months’ imprisonment for violating the 1934 Burma Aircraft 
Act, and they faced additional charges of violating an import-export rule for bringing 
the drone into the country, which carries a maximum three-year sentence.30  After 
adding an additional immigration charge against the journalists that could have 
carried a six-month to five-year prison sentence,31 Myanmar dropped the additional 
charges (the import-export and immigration charges) and released the journalists and 
their crew on December 28, 2017.32  A Myanmar court also recently sentenced 
Arthur Desclaux, a French national, to one month in prison for flying a drone over 
the parliament.33  Although Myanmar has an interest in regulating airspace above its 
parliament building, criminalizing drone flight and subjecting violators to a 
potentially lengthy prison sentence seems calculated to punish journalists in a 
country notoriously unfriendly to the press.  Safety regulations are important, but at 
some point, they can become a pretext to prevent legitimate journalism.  This Note 
proceeds with the goal of avoiding under- or overregulation of commercial drones in 
mind. 
II. THE FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL REGULATORY PICTURE 
A drone journalist must navigate an ever-evolving labyrinth of federal, state, and 
local regulations if she desires to keep her drone in the sky, her wallet full, and her 
 
 27. 14 C.F.R. § 48.205 (2019). 
 28. Andrew Liptak, London’s Heathrow and Gatwick Airports Have Purchased Their Own Anti-
Drone Systems, VERGE (Jan. 5, 2019, 2:53 PM), https://perma.cc/CMB7-RDRX. 
 29. Myanmar Jails Foreign Journalists with Turkish Broadcaster for Two Months, REUTERS (Nov. 
10, 2017, 10:10 AM), https://perma.cc/8PKR-FYCP.  
 30. Id.  News reports do not detail what the journalists were convicted of under the Aircraft Act, 
possibly because, as the journalists complained, “We have no idea what is going on, and we are not 
allowed to speak to our family . . . And the rules and procedures are not explained to us.  We were asked 
to sign statements that are completely in Burmese that we cannot understand.”  Id.  See also The Burma 
Aircraft Act, India Act XXII of 1934 (as amended in 2004).  
 31. Myanmar Adds Additional Charge Against 2 Foreign Journalists, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 
27, 2017), https://perma.cc/P5PV-Q5Q5. 
 32. Thu Thu Aung, Myanmar Frees Journalists Working for Turkish Broadcaster, REUTERS (Dec. 
29, 2017, 5:53 AM), https://perma.cc/8GGP-QA3M. 
 33. Myanmar Court Sentences Frenchman to Jail for Flying Drone, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 27, 
2019), https://perma.cc/TA25-AY5R.  
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person free.  At the federal level, the FAA considers the complex problem of how to 
make rules that successfully integrate commercial drones into already crowded 
federally-controlled airspace.  As the agency responsible for regulating the safety of 
civil aviation,34 the FAA focuses on the safety aspects of commercial drone 
regulation and largely leaves privacy regulations to state and local governments.35  
State and local governments also enact regulations that purport to promote drone 
safety, in excess and sometimes in contradiction of FAA standards.36  Accordingly, 
although safety and privacy are surely areas of legitimate commercial drone 
regulation,37 the present system is too complex for an average journalist to 
understand it easily.38 
A.  THE FEDERAL REGULATORY SCHEME: INTEGRATING DRONES INTO 
NAVIGABLE AIRSPACE SAFELY 
Presenting the first layer of complexity, the FAA’s drone regulations impose 
registration requirements for commercial drones, set the rules of the sky when 
operating these drones, and prescribe permissible drone uses.  The FAA also 
administers a waiver program for some rules. 
While some of the FAA’s regulations could be seen as a regulation of drones for 
privacy purposes, Congress emphasized that the FAA should focus on the safety of 
commercial drone operation, without detailed consideration of the privacy 
implications.39  In formulating its 2016 rules, the FAA specifically said that it 
focused only on regulating the safe and efficient use of drones, and left the privacy 
implications to other agencies and stakeholders.40  Following this trend, the drone 
provisions of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (“2018 Act”) also focus on 
safety, with a slightly increased focus on privacy.41  The 2018 Act directs much of 
 
 34. What We Do, FAA, https://perma.cc/2R5S-RZUQ (last visited March 20, 2019); Safety: The 
Foundation of Everything We Do, FAA, https://perma.cc/RFK4-SFRY (last visited March 20, 2019). 
 35. See infra Part II.B. 
 36. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 37. A group advocating for drone journalism agrees.  See Al Tompkins, Help Drone Journalism 
Grow Responsibly, NAT’L PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N (Sep./Oct. 2017), https://perma.cc/KX2E-
EVVG (stating that “safety is the first concern” and encouraging journalists to ask whether they would 
“do that” when capturing an image on the ground to account for privacy concerns). 
 38. See Fox, supra note 21.  
 39. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 § 332(a)(1), 49 U.S.C.A. § 44802(a)(1) (Westlaw 
through P.L. 116-66) (instructing the FAA to “develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the 
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system” (emphasis added)).  In 
defining the parameters of the plan, Congress called for the FAA to focus on the safe operation of drones 
in the national airspace system without specifically referencing protecting privacy.  FAA Modernization 
and Reform Act of 2012 § 332(2).  See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 107.39 (2019) (prohibiting operation of a drone 
over a human being unless that human is “directly participating” in its operation or “[l]ocated under a 
covered structure or inside a stationary vehicle that can provide reasonable protection from a falling small 
unmanned aircraft”).  The allowance for operating a drone over a human being if they are reasonably 
protected from a falling drone shows that this is a “safety” regulation rather than a “privacy” one. 
 40. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 
42,190–91 (June 28, 2016), https://perma.cc/PN25-GLSG.  
 41. For one, the subtitle of the Act regarding drones falls under “Title III” of the Act, which is 
simply titled “Safety,” see FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–254, 132 Stat. 3186. 
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its ink toward safety-related provisions, including:  allowing drones to carry property 
for compensation or hire;42 prohibiting outfitting drones with weapons;43 and 
exempting underground mining drones from FAA regulations.44  When the 2018 Act 
does discuss privacy in connection with drones, it does not grant the FAA any 
additional rulemaking power.45  To the extent that Congress in the 2018 Act 
discusses the privacy concerns raised by the increasingly large flock of drones in the 
national airspace system, it does not charge the FAA with any responsibility to tackle 
or evaluate the problem.  Therefore, the federal regulations are properly considered 
as regulations of drone safety, rather than privacy from drones. 
1. The Pilot Certification and Drone Registration Process 
As an initial step, the FAA requires commercial drone pilots to obtain a pilot’s 
certification and register their drones.  The FAA considers drones used for journalism 
to be commercial drones and, therefore, subject to its commercial drone rules.46  
Thus, journalists using drones must comply with the FAA’s commercial use 
requirements.47 
The FAA currently requires commercial drone pilots to obtain a remote pilot 
certification with a small drone rating.48  To obtain a remote pilot certificate, a 
commercial drone pilot must:  (a) be at least sixteen years old; (b) be able to speak, 
 
 42. Id. § 348. 
 43. Id. § 363. 
 44. Id. § 354. 
 45. Congress simply expresses the policy that drone operation “shall be carried out in a manner that 
respects and protects personal privacy consistent with the United States Constitution and Federal, State, 
and local law[,]” id. § 357, and requires the Comptroller General to undergo a study of the “privacy issues 
and concerns associated with the operation of unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace system,” 
id. § 358. 
 46. See Love, Lawson & Holton, supra note 5, at 40–45 (describing FAA crackdowns on First 
Amendment activity and implicit treatment of newsgathering via drone or publishing drone footage 
captured by a hobby user as commercial); see also Shelley Hepworth, The New Drone Rules: What 
Journalists Need to Know, COLUM. JOURNALISM. REV. (Aug. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/4FBN-GUFV; 
(taking as a given that journalism uses are commercial).  The distinction between recreational and 
commercial drone use may be thin after the 2018 Act.  The 2012 Act’s “special rule for model aircraft” 
limited the regulations that the FAA could place on small recreational drones, provided that the drone did 
not interfere with manned aircraft and was flown within the operator’s visual line of sight, and that the 
operator notified air traffic control if the drone would be within five miles of an airport.  FAA 
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 § 336, repealed by FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 § 349(b)(2), 
49 U.S.C.A. § 44809 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-65).  The 2018 Act imposes additional restrictions 
on recreational flight, including a 400-foot ceiling if flown in Class G airspace (with authorization 
requirements for Class B, C, or D airspace) as well as pilot certification and drone registration 
requirements.  FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 § 349(a).  It also allows FAA to make rules that are 
“generally applicable” to unmanned aircraft such as updates to recreational operating parameters and the 
registration and marking of drones.  Id. § 349. 
 47. See 14 C.F.R. § 107.11–51 (2019) (prescribing safety restrictions on commercial operators 
including not operating the drone under the influence of alcohol or drugs, not carrying “hazardous 
material” with a drone, and not flying within 500 feet vertically or 2,000 feet horizontally of a cloud).  
 48. See id. § 107.12.  Alternatively, a person without a license may operate a commercial drone if 
directly supervised by a small commercial drone pilot with the ability to take direct control of the aircraft.  
Id. 
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write, and understand English (subject to medical waiver); (c) not know or have 
reason to know of a physical or mental condition that would interfere with safely 
operating a drone; and (d) have passed either an initial knowledge test or a recurrent 
knowledge test within the past twenty-four months.49  Both the initial and recurrent 
knowledge tests cover, inter alia, regulations applicable to drone flight, airspace 
classification, emergency procedures, aeronautical decision-making and judgment, 
airport operations, and maintenance and preflight inspection procedures;50 the initial 
knowledge test additionally covers radio communication procedures, effects of 
weather on drone performance, and the physiological effects of drugs and alcohol.51  
After passing an initial knowledge test, a prospective pilot may file an application 
for a remote pilot certificate.52  Once received, a commercial drone pilot must keep 
her pilot certification on her person while operating the drone and be able to produce 
this certificate upon request.53  Several journalism schools have started drone 
journalism programs where they teach aspiring drone journalists how to pilot a 
drone.54 
In addition to obtaining a remote pilot certificate, drone journalists must register 
their drones with the FAA.  Commercial drone operators may register their drones 
on the FAA website, subject to a $5 fee, with the registration valid for three years.55  
After successful registration, drone journalists must keep their drone registration on 
their person while flying.56  They must also affix their drone registration number to 
the exterior of the device.57  Unlike other civil aircraft, drones are not subject to 
airworthiness requirements.58  Instead, pilots must inspect the drone to ensure it is 
 
 49. Id. § 107.61.  Alternatively, a drone pilot may demonstrate her aeronautical knowledge and 
thus satisfy the final criteria for pilot certification if she holds a pilot’s license issued under 14 C.F.R. 
§ 61, meets the flight review requirements in 14 C.F.R. § 61.56, and completes an initial training course 
in commercial drone flight, as specified in 14. C.F.R. § 107.74.  See id. § 107.61(d)(2). 
 50. Id. § 107.73(b). 
 51. Id. § 107.73(a).  The FAA offers a number of testing locations.  See, e.g., Locate a Testing 
Center, COMPUTER ASSISTED TESTING SERV., https://perma.cc/3CCN-ZWBY (last visited Oct. 27, 2019).  
Aspiring commercial drone operators should expect to wait a few days to receive their test scores, after 
which they undergo a background check, receive a temporary certificate under 14 C.F.R. § 107.64, and, 
finally, receive a permanent certificate.  See Will McDonald, How to Fly Drones for Journalism in the 
U.S., POYNTER (Apr. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/T53F-4XSZ. 
 52. 14 C.F.R. § 107.63 (2019). 
 53. Id. § 107.7. 
 54. See, e.g., Amy Dunkin, Drone Journalism Takes off at the Newmark J-School, CRAIG 
NEWMARK GRADUATE SCH. OF JOURNALISM (Oct. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/H2EK-HHEB; Rick Shaw, 
Drone Flight Labs – Spring 2017, UNIV. OF MO. DRONE JOURNALISM (Apr. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/
4S2P-SNZ9. 
 55. See FAADRONEZONE, https://perma.cc/6G5P-27C9 (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); Certified 
Remote Pilots Including Commercial Operators, FAA (Aug. 20, 2019, 11:17:47 AM), https://perma.cc/
36LU-8Q9N. 
 56. See 14 C.F.R § 107.13 (2019); id. § 91.203(a)(2). 
 57. Id. pt. 48 (2019). 
 58. Fact Sheet – Small Unmanned Aircraft Regulations (Part 107), FAA (July 23, 2018), https://
perma.cc/36LU-8Q9N (“You are responsible for ensuring a drone is safe before flying, but the FAA does 
not require small UAS to comply with current agency airworthiness standards or obtain aircraft 
certification.  For example, you will have to perform a preflight inspection that includes checking the 
communications link between the control station and the UAS.”). 
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safe for flight prior to takeoff and must discontinue use if they know or have reason 
to know that their drone is no longer safe.59  Finally, the 2018 Act makes it a criminal 
offense to knowingly or recklessly interfere with a manned aircraft.60 
2. The Rules of the Sky and Notable Examples of The Waiver Process 
In addition to requiring commercial drone operators to obtain a license and a 
registration number for their drone, the FAA also addresses the safe operation of 
drones by imposing rules of the sky that ban a swath of conduct.61  Drone operators 
may not fly over crowds or any human being unless they are “directly participating” 
in the drone’s operation or located underneath a structure that provides reasonable 
protection from falling drones.62  Operators also may not fly their drone at night and 
may only fly during “periods of civil twilight” when the drone is equipped with 
anticollision lighting visible for “at least 3 statute miles.”63  Additionally, a remote 
operator who does not maintain a visual line of sight with the drone (perhaps because 
she observes the drone through binoculars or a control pad displaying a live video 
feed) must employ a visual observer to “maintain awareness” of the drone “through 
direct visual observation” to ensure it avoids “air traffic or hazards” and “does not 
endanger the life or property of another.”64  The regulations similarly prohibit any 
pilot or visual observer from operating more than one drone at a time.65  Finally, the 
regulations impose a series of operating limitations that constrain commercial 
operators.  Drones may not fly higher than 400 feet above the ground,66 and must 
maintain a certain distance from clouds.67  Drones must yield right of way to manned 
 
 59. 14 C.F.R. § 107.15 (2019). 
 60. FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 § 384; 18 U.S.C.A. § 39B (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 
116-65).  In the years leading up to the 2018 Act, members of Congress proposed alternative laws to 
regulate drones.  This provision mirrors a bill proposed by Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, see Drone Operator 
Safety Act of 2017, S. 1755, 115th Cong. (introduced Aug. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/J9YY-WPVT, and 
serves as an example of a proposed law that made its way into the 2018 Act.  But see infra Part III.B 
(discussing proposed bills that ended up on the cutting room floor). 
 61. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.15–51 (2019).  
 62. Id. § 107.39; see also Part 107 Waivers, FAA (Aug. 1, 2019, 2:14:22 PM), https://perma.cc/
7HL3-UU6G (defining “over” as “directly over any part of a person. . . . An operation during which a 
small UAS flies over any part of any person, regardless of the dwell time, if any, over the person, would 
be an operation over people” and defining “directly participating” personnel as “specific personnel that 
the remote pilot in command has deemed to be involved with the flight operation of the small unmanned 
aircraft” including the remote pilot in command, the person manipulating a drone’s controls, the visual 
observer, and “any person who is necessary for the safety of the . . . operation”). 
 63. 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.29(a)–(b) (2019).  “Civil twilight” is defined as the period thirty minutes 
before official sunrise or official sunset until official sunrise or official sunset, except in Alaska.  Id. § 
107.29(c).  A “statute mile” measures 5,280 feet and is otherwise called a “mile.”  See Mile, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner, 10th ed. 2014).  It should not be confused with a nautical mile.  Id. 
 64. 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.31–33 (2019). 
 65. Id. § 107.35. 
 66. Id. § 107.51(b).  Alternatively, drones can fly within 400 feet of the “immediate uppermost 
limit” of structures.  See id.  For examples of what a drone can see from 400 feet, see Stetson Doggett, 
What Does a Drone See from 400 Feet, DRONEGENUITY, https://perma.cc/ZDL9-P69S (last visited Oct. 
27, 2019). 
 67. 14 C.F.R. § 107.51(d) (2019) (requiring that drones maintain a minimum distance of 500 feet 
below clouds and 2,000 feet horizontally away from the cloud). 
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aircraft,68 stay out of Class B, C, or D airspace,69 stay away from prohibited or 
restricted areas,70 and respect temporary airspace restrictions generally applicable to 
aircraft.71 
The FAA provides a process for obtaining a waiver of most of these provisions.72  
When the FAA first promulgated Part 107, obtaining a waiver was a long, drawn-out 
process.  The head of CNN’s drone journalism division, Greg Agvent, describes 
obtaining CNN’s first-ever waiver of the flight-over-people prohibition as a 
headache-inducing, two-and-a-half-year process in which “there were times when 
we were frustrated with the FAA, and I think there were just as many times when the 
FAA was frustrated with us.”73  CNN obtained the first flight-over-people waiver on 
August 29, 2016.74  Today, forty-nine additional flight-over-people waivers are 
active.75 
Drone operators can now apply for waivers of Part 107’s provisions through the 
FAA’s “DroneZone” web portal.76  In this application, a waiver seeker must describe 
the details of how she plans to use the drone, including how high the drone will fly 
and in what type of airspace; the drone’s specs, including the drone’s type, size, and 
power source; personnel details, including level of experience and training; and the 
operational risks associated with the proposed waiver and how the operator will 
mitigate them.77  The FAA considers the risk mitigation assessment to be of the 
utmost importance and will deny any waiver application submitted “without hazard 
identification and risk mitigation strategies.”78  The FAA intends to “do our best and 
review and approve or disapprove waiver requests within ninety days of submission,” 
depending on the complexity of the application (for example, the type of waiver 
requested).79  As of the 2018 Act, the FAA must promptly confirm that the agency 
has received a filed application and must provide updates on the application’s 
status.80  In addition to waivers, drone operators may apply for an “instant 
authorization” (a temporary status) to fly in controlled airspace, through the Low 
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) tool accessible via the 
 
 68. See id. § 107.37(a).  
 69. Id. § 107.41. 
 70. Id. § 107.45. 
 71. Id. § 107.47; see also id. §§ 91.137–145; id. § 99.7. 
 72. Of the above-discussed provisions, only the restrictions on flight in prohibited or restricted 
areas and flight in temporarily restricted airspace are not waivable.  See id. § 107.205.  A drone pilot may 
obtain temporary authorization to operate in these areas.  See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 73.  See #083 – CNN AIR With Greg Agvent, supra note 6, at 16:15–16:40. 
 74. See Part 107 Waivers Issued, FAA, (Aug. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/UV8N-2AG2. 
 75. Id.  Compared to the one flight-over-people waiver granted in 2016, eight were granted in 2017, 
thirteen were granted in 2018, and twenty-nine were granted in 2019, as of August 22, 2019. 
 76. See FAADRONEZONE, https://perma.cc/PS52-8HN7 (last visited Mar. 20, 2019). 
 77. Waiver Safety Explanation Guidelines for Part 107 Waiver Applications, FAA (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/RVQ2-Z8HH; see also FAA, How-To Apply for a Drone Waiver, YOUTUBE (June 7, 
2018), https://perma.cc/3HT9-5S7D.  
 78. See FAA, How-To Identify, Assess & Mitigate Risks Posed to Your Drone Operation, 
YOUTUBE (June 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/66RB-UJMX.  
 79. Part 107 Waivers, FAA (Dec. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/3VDG-KDYF. 
 80. See FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 § 352(b). 
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“DroneZone” portal or a third-party app.81  This authorization allows for flight in 
controlled airspace, near airports, and in areas of temporary restrictions.  In short, the 
FAA has gradually facilitated easier access to commercial drone regulation waivers. 
It is worth considering whether the waiver process properly accommodates drone 
journalism.  The waiver process, at least, allows pilots who have obtained waivers to 
operate their drones in ways that would otherwise be unlawful.  CNN’s waivers 
provide an illustration of drone waivers for journalism.  CNN currently has four 
waivers to fly over people for various types of drones,82 one waiver to fly up to 600 
feet,83 and one to fly at night, beyond a minimum flight visibility of three statute 
miles and closer to clouds than usually permissible.84  Taking CNN’s third waiver 
for flight over people as an example, the waiver certificate indicates that CNN 
submitted a number of supporting documents that described how CNN would 
mitigate risk.85  The waiver imposes a number of requirements for flying over people, 
including:  CNN must use the specific drone model with which they applied, the 
drone may not fly higher than 150 feet, direct participants (essentially the flight crew) 
must wear easily identifiable clothing, and CNN must keep records of any flights 
conducted under the waiver.86  On the other hand, CNN’s second flight-over-people 
waiver does not require a specific drone, but imposes much more restrictive 
limitations on how the drone can be flown.87  In contrast, CNN’s fourth flight-over-
people waiver requires that the drone be flown higher than sixty-three feet over non-
participants, be no heavier than 3.55 pounds, and be equipped with a parachute 
system to mitigate risk.88  CNN’s nighttime waiver also contains a provision that 
allows a drone to fly closer to clouds than usual during the daylight.  To fly under 
this waiver, CNN must issue a Notice to Airmen of an operation at least twenty-four 
hours before the operation and needs to use anticollision lighting and reflective 
 
 81. FAADRONEZONE, https://perma.cc/FRH9-RMK7 (last visited Mar. 20, 2019); see, e.g., Access 
LAANC with Skyward, SKYWARD, https://perma.cc/R285-T7R6 (last visited Mar. 20, 2019) (third-party 
app offering Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Ability, or LAANC); see also FAA, How-To 
Apply for a Drone Waiver, YOUTUBE (June 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/T4NG-WSYS (5:40–7:40) 
(distinguishing between waivers and airspace authorization).  
 82. Certificate of Waiver or Authorization, No. 107W-2019-04251, FAA (Aug. 7, 2019), https://
perma.cc/SRG3-6PDC [hereinafter “CNN’s Flight Over People Waiver IV”]; Certificate of Waiver or 
Authorization, No. 107W-2017-04544, FAA (Oct. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/B2BK-S7DL [hereinafter 
“CNN’s Flight Over People Waiver III”]; Certificate of Waiver or Authorization, No. 107W-2017-
03321A, FAA (Aug. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/B6N9-8ESN [hereinafter “CNN’s Flight Over People 
Waiver II”]; Certificate of Waiver or Authorization, No. 107W-2016-00001A, FAA (Nov. 15, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/DTR7-CYS3 [hereinafter “CNN’s Flight Over People Waiver I”]. 
 83. Certificate of Waiver or Authorization, No. 107W-2017-01043A1, FAA (May 5, 2017), https:/
/perma.cc/PUK5-V7U5 [hereinafter “CNN’s Altitude Waiver”]. 
 84. Certificate of Waiver or Authorization, No. 107W-2016-01677A, FAA (June 27, 2017), https:/
/perma.cc/J6ZG-YRV5 [hereinafter “CNN’s Nighttime and Cloud Waiver”]. 
 85. CNN’s Flight Over People Waiver III, supra note 82, at 2. 
 86.  Id. at 3–5; see also Vantage Robotics, Introducing Vantage Robotic’s Snap. The First Safe 
Portable Flying Camera., YOUTUBE (Sept. 2, 2015), https://perma.cc/F972-VVDH (depicting the drone 
that CNN must use with its third flight-over-people waiver).  
 87.  See CNN’s Flight Over People Waiver II, supra note 82, at 4–6. 
 88.  See CNN’s Flight Over People Waiver IV, supra note 82, at 3, 5–6. 
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coating on the exterior of the drone.89  These waivers show that the waiver process 
is equipped to accommodate innovative uses of drones for journalism and content 
production purposes. 
The FAA has started to relax two Part 107 provisions with a new proposed rule.90  
First, the proposed rule would allow drone flight to be conducted at night if the pilot 
underwent additional knowledge testing or training and if the drone was equipped 
with an anticollision light that was visible for at least three statute miles.91  The 
anticollision light requirement may be waived entirely if an applicant demonstrates 
“sufficient measures to mitigate the risk associated with the proposed operation.”92  
Additionally, and importantly for drone journalism, the draft rule proposes relaxing 
the prohibition against flying over people who are not directly participating in the 
operation or protected from falling drones.93  The proposed rule would group drones 
flying over people into three distinct categories, based on the potential of that type 
of drone to injure someone if it fell.94  The first category would impose no operational 
restrictions if the drone weighed less than 0.55 pounds.95  The second category would 
also impose no operational restrictions if a drone weighing more than 0.55 pounds:   
(1) was designed in such a way that a falling drone would not result in serious injury; 
(2) did not have exposed rotating parts capable of lacerating human skin; and (3) had 
no FAA-identified safety defects.96  The third category (any drone without an 
exposed rotor that would not severely injure a person in a drone fall, with a greater 
chance of injury than the second category) imposes the following operational 
restrictions: (1) prohibiting flight over any open-air assembly of people; (2) limiting 
operations to a closed site where people are on notice that a drone might fly over 
them; (3) restricting any operations not in the closed site, to “transit[ing] but not 
hover[ing] over people[.]”97  A user of a category two or three commercial drone 
must label it as such before using it for an operation over people.98  The proposed 
rule does not discuss limitations applicable to drones that do not fall into one of the 
three categories; presumably, those drones are subject to the current prohibition on 
flights over people.  Although it has not yet been finalized, this rule would make 
flying over people and flying at night even easier if using a compliant drone. 
 
 89.  CNN’s Nighttime and Cloud Waiver, supra note 84, at 3–4. 
 90.  Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People, 84 Fed. Reg. 3856 (proposed 
Feb. 13, 2019) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107), https://perma.cc/N5TL-RXD7. 
 91. For a definition of “statute mile,” see supra note 63. 
 92. Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People, 84 Fed. Reg. at 3857–58, 3869, 
https://perma.cc/N5TL-RXD7. 
 93. Id. at 3857–59. 
 94. Id. at 3858. 
 95. Id. at 3856 (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 107.120(a)(2)–(2)).  For reference, CNN’s first flight-
over-people waiver requires that the drone weigh less than 1.37 pounds.  CNN’s Flight Over People 
Waiver I, supra note 82, at 3. 
 96. Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People, 84 Fed. Reg. at 3858. 
 97. Id. at 3858–59.  The second requirement resembles CNN’s flight-over-people waiver’s notice 
requirement.  See CNN’s Flight Over People Waiver I, supra note 82, at 4. 
 98. Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People, 84 Fed. Reg. at 3860. 
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B. THE THREE CATEGORIES OF STATE AND LOCAL LAWS 
In addition to the federal safety regulations on commercial drone use, state and 
local governments also impose regulations on drones.99  These regulations are not 
limited to safety regulations; state and local governments are also concerned with 
privacy and region-specific interests like hunting and other environmental 
regulations.  However, these regulations pose a risk of impeding journalism.  Poorly-
drawn regulations run the risk of inadvertently criminalizing journalistic drone uses 
or imposing compliance costs for drone journalists.  When enacting a drone 
regulation, the implications for drone journalism and its concomitant First 
Amendment interests should never be far from regulators’ minds. 
In addition to safety, privacy, and region-specific regulations, several state 
governments have also preempted local governments from passing drone-related 
rules.  Currently, at least nine states preempt local governments from enacting any 
regulation related to drone flight.100  Two other states preempt some local laws with 
exceptions:  Connecticut preempts local laws but allows municipalities to pass 
ordinances or resolutions for the purpose of protecting their water supply;101 and 
Florida prohibits local governments from enacting safety-related regulations but 
allows local ordinances “relating to nuisances, voyeurism, harassment, reckless 
endangerment, property damage, or other illegal acts arising from the use of [drones] 
if such laws or ordinances are not specifically related to the use of an unmanned 
aircraft system for those illegal acts.”102  Thus, over twenty percent of states have 
adopted preemption schemes to ensure orderly regulation of commercial drones.103  
Finally, some jurisdictions have passed complete bans on commercial drone flight,104 
or have resolutions to ban municipal agencies (including law enforcement) from 
using drones until adequate “Constitutional safeguards” to protect citizens’ First and 
 
 99. “Local” refers to any subdivision of a state government, including county, city, town, village, 
and parish governments.  Cf., e.g., Drone Innovation Act of 2017 § 2(2), H.R. 2930, 115th Cong. 
(introduced June 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/XK5Q-Y7KJ (defining “local” in this way). 
 100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1334(e) (West, Westlaw through ch. 210 of the 150th Gen. Assemb. 
(2019-2020)); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-926.3 (West, Westlaw through end of 2019 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 6-1-4 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess. of Gen. Assemb.) (preempting local ordinances adopted 
after April 1, 2017, but grandfathering in any ordinances passed before that date); LA. STAT. ANN. § 2:2(A) 
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 259.305(1) (Westlaw through P.A.2019, 
No. 57, of 2019 Reg. Sess., 100th Leg.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-14-103 (West, Westlaw through 2019 
Gen. Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3729(C) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 54th Leg. (2019)); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 1-8-1 (Matthew Bender, LEXIS through ch. 310 of 2019 Sess.) (granting 
exclusive authority to the state of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island Airport Corporation to impose drone 
regulations); MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 14-301(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of Gen. 
Assemb.).  Interestingly, the Town of Bethany Beach, Delaware, enacted a municipal ordinance 
prohibiting, among other things, flight over its beach, boardwalk, and other public places, setting up 
potential state and federal preemption fights.  See BETHANY BEACH, DEL., ORDINANCES ch. 212, art. III, 
§§ 212-6, 212-7, https://perma.cc/6JD2-GP24. 
 101. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-149b(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Jan. Reg. Sess. and 2019 
July Spec. Sess.). 
 102. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 330.41(3)(b)–(c) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of 26th Leg.). 
 103. Cf. Part III.B. 
 104. See Part III.B.4 for discussion of a Newton, Massachusetts, ordinance effectively barring 
commercial drone flight that was struck down as preempted by federal regulations. 
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Fourth Amendment rights are in place.105 
1. Safety Regulations 
State and local governments regulate drones in a number of ways that promote 
safe use.  These regulations can take the shape of bans on drone flight in specified 
places based on the sensitivity of the location, temporary bans on drone flight based 
on a particularly sensitive event, prohibitions against weaponizing drones, and 
limiting the drone use of certain people.  Also, some municipalities make it a locally 
enforceable misdemeanor to violate federal regulations.106 
First, permanent bans on drone flight in certain places are perhaps the most 
popular form of local safety regulation.  Some of these laws are expansive, such as 
Oxford, Alabama’s ordinance that applies up to a $500 fine or up to six months’ 
incarceration for flying a drone on municipal property, including city parks and 
recreational areas, except in cases where the police chief has given written 
permission for drone flight.107  Similarly, Bonita Springs, Florida, requires that a 
person who wants to use a drone to photograph activity in a municipal park must 
have a special event permit and may photograph only their special event.108  In 
addition to prohibitions over parks, several states also expressly forbid operations 
over correctional facilities or places defined as “critical infrastructure.”  For example, 
Wisconsin prohibits any flight over a correctional facility including its grounds, 
subject to a $5,000 fine,109 while Oklahoma law prohibits flying within 400 feet of 
“critical infrastructure,” including prisons, dams regulated by the state or federal 
government, or “a port, railroad switching yard, trucking terminal or other freight 
transportation facility.”110  Similarly, although Arkansas does not prohibit flight over 
critical infrastructure, it prohibits using a drone to “conduct surveillance of, . . . or 
photographically or electronically record critical infrastructure” without the owner’s 
written consent.111  This regulation indicates how safety regulations can impose 
burdens on journalism in excess of operational limits. 
 
 105. SYRACUSE COMMON COUNCIL, N.Y., RES. 36-R (Dec. 16, 2013), https://perma.cc/B5XD-
9NDB. 
 106. See, e.g., CALABASAS, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.10.030(1) (2019), https://perma.cc/G4JG-XQXE. 
 107. OXFORD, ALA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 26, art XI, §§ 26-292–94 (2019), https://perma.cc/
AS6W-E6PX; see also 312 IND. ADMIN. CODE 8-2-8(i) (Westlaw through Sept. 4, 2019) (prohibiting 
drone use in state parks, subject to waiver). 
 108. See BONITA SPRINGS, FLA., CITY CODE ch. 28, art. II, § 28-41(k) (2019), https://perma.cc/
E3B5-9MMT.  Confusingly, the ordinance also requires that “the fields” be “unoccupied” if a drone is to 
be used.  Id.  The ordinance also prohibits flying drones within twenty-five feet of “people, power lines, 
buildings, or light fixtures.”  Id. 
 109. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 114.045 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 5). 
 110. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 322 (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 57th Leg. (2019)).  Of 
course, this height establishes an effective ban, unless a commercial drone operator has a waiver from the 
FAA to fly above 400 feet.  See supra note 83 and accompanying text (mentioning CNN’s waiver to fly 
up to 600 feet above ground).  Compare Nevada law that prohibits operation without consent “500 
horizontal feet” or “250 vertical feet” over critical infrastructure, which seems would allow drone 
journalism.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 493.109 (West, Westlaw through end of 80th Reg. Sess. (2019)). 
 111. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-103(b) (West, Westlaw through end of 2019 Reg. Sess. of 92nd Ark. 
Gen. Assemb.). 
FISCHER, PRIORITIZING JOURNALISM IN COMMERCIAL DRONE REGULATION, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 107 (2019) 
2019] PRIORITIZING JOURNALISM IN COMMERCIAL DRONE REGULATION 121 
Next, state and local governments also deploy temporary bans on flight based on 
special events.  For example, Miami, Florida, has established an ordinance that bans 
drone activity within a half mile of its professional sports stadiums and other large 
venues during “large venue special events.”112  The ordinance explains that the 
“restrictions are intended to protect persons gathered in groups where a UAS incident 
would cause greater harm and risk of injury due to a greater number of people 
gathered in a close proximity.”113  It also provides a waiver process for special 
events, and requires an operator to carry liability insurance.114  Schaumberg Village, 
Illinois, similarly prohibits drone flight during any special event (defined as “[a]ny 
public gathering or event held outdoors on Village Property” requiring a permit) 
within 100 feet of any village property.115 The Schaumberg ordinance does not 
provide any waiver mechanism.116  Finally, some cities will impose temporary bans 
on drone flights during specific weeks when activity is expected to be at its most 
hectic.117  The FAA similarly imposes bans for special events.118 
Finally, state and local governments also limit the use of drones, and who can use 
drones, to promote safety.  For example, several states prohibit outfitting drones with 
weapons, firearms, explosives, destructive devices, or ammunition.119  Oregon 
makes purposely, knowingly, or recklessly using a weaponized drone to cause 
serious physical injury to another person a Class B felony, using the system to fire a 
bullet or projectile a Class C felony, and equipping a drone with a weapon a Class A 
misdemeanor.120  Nevada, similarly, makes it a category C felony to weaponize a 
drone and fire the equipped weapon.121  Notably, Congress also recently forbade the 
weaponization of drones in the 2018 Act.122  Finally, several states forbid registered 
sex offenders from using drones to knowingly or intentionally follow, contact, or 
capture images of specific people.123 
2. Privacy Regulations 
In addition to imposing regulations on drones to preserve safety interests, state 
and local governments also impose regulations to protect the privacy of individuals.  
 
 112. MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-12 (2019), https://perma.cc/9GSY-6UM4. 
 113. Id.   
 114. Id. § 37-12(d), (g). 
 115. SCHAUMBURG, ILL., ORDINANCE 15-070 (July 28, 2015), https://perma.cc/LZ54-DLDW. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Pan Am. v. Municipality of San Juan, Civ. No. 18-1017, 2018 WL 6503215, at *2 (D.P.R. 
Dec. 10, 2018).  
 118. See, e.g., Atlanta is a “No Drone Zone” During Super Bowl LII, FAA, (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/PP8M-72AM.  
 119. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 330.411 (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of 26th Leg.).  
Somewhat redundantly, Miami, Florida, also prohibits using drones that are “equipped to carry a weapon.”  
MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-12(c)(2)(a) (2019), https://perma.cc/9GSY-6UM4. 
 120. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.365(1)–(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 legislation).  
 121. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 493.106(2) (West, Westlaw through 80th Reg. Sess. (2019)). 
 122. See supra note 43. 
 123. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-12.5 (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of 121st Gen. 
Assemb.); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 259.322(4) (Westlaw through P.A.2019, No. 57, of 2019 Reg. Sess., 
100th Leg.). 
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Privacy regulations ultimately break into two broad categories:  those that regulate 
how private citizens can operate drones and those that impose limitations on law 
enforcement use of drones.  This Section focuses on state and local laws that regulate 
the conduct of private individuals.124  These regulations break down into several 
categories:  statutes that specifically enumerate lawful drone uses, those that modify 
existing criminal laws for the drone age, those that specifically prohibit “trespass” 
by drone, and those that prohibit intrusions on expectations of privacy. 
Tennessee’s Senate Bill 1892 provides an example of a privacy regulation that 
specifically exempts certain drone uses.125  The statute makes it a class C 
misdemeanor to use a drone to photograph an individual or privately-owned real 
property with the intent to “conduct surveillance on the individual or property 
captured in the image” or to knowingly publish such an image.126  The statute does 
not define “surveillance.”  An affirmative defense is (1) destroying the offending 
image as soon as the person knew the way the image was captured violated the statute 
if (2) the person did not “disclos[e], display[], or distribut[e]” the image to a third 
party.127  The statute also expressly exempts sixteen different uses, such as academic 
research, military operations, fire suppression, and licensed real estate brokers “in 
connection with the marketing, sale, or financing of real property” (as long as no 
individuals are visible in the image).128  The statute does not exempt journalists.129  
Although this law is clear, it does not seem to leave much room for drone journalism, 
unless a journalist receives express permission to fly over private property––a 
potentially difficult task in an emergency or in the course of investigative reporting.  
The prohibition on publication potentially criminalizes a journalist publishing drone 
footage obtained by someone else.  The lack of a journalistic exception for these 
provisions when other exceptions are specified is problematic and troubling. 
Other states take a nuisance-inspired trespass approach to drone use.  For 
 
 124. Law enforcement uses, the Fourth Amendment implications, and the state and local regulations 
posing limitations on law enforcement are fascinating but are beyond the scope of this Note. For 
discussions of these issues, see Jessica Dwyer-Moss, The Sky Police: Drones and the Fourth Amendment, 
81 ALB. L. REV. 1047 (2017); Matthew R. Koerner, Note, Drones and the Fourth Amendment: Redefining 
Expectations of Privacy, 64 DUKE L.J. 1129 (2015).  While advocating for increased usage of drones for 
journalism, I am mindful of potentially reducing individuals’ expectations of privacy with a proliferation 
of flying newsgathering machines.  See Beth Shane, Note, After ‘Knowing Exposure’: First and Fourth 
Amendment Dimensions of Drone Regulation, 73 N.Y.U. SURV. AM. L. 323, 347–48 (2018) (“Not only 
does drone journalism increase the likelihood of an individual being unwittingly caught on camera while 
navigating the public space, but under the current Fourth Amendment doctrine, the more pervasive the 
civilian use of drones, the stronger the government’s right to surveil its citizenry without triggering Fourth 
Amendment protections.”); Marc Jonathan Blitz, James Grimsley, Stephen E. Henderson & Joseph T. 
Thai, Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 110 
(2015).  Without spending too much time on the question, a recognition that pervasive drone use allows 
low-cost law enforcement information gathering would be essential to balancing First and Fourth 
Amendment interests.  Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018). 
 125. TENN. CODE ANN § 39-13-902 (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Extraordinary Sess. of 111th 
Tenn. Gen. Assemb.).  Texas has a similar statute, discussed infra Part II.C. 
 126. Id. § 39-13-903(a)–(b). 
 127. Id. § 39-13-903(c). 
 128. Id. § 39-13-902(a)(1)–(16). 
 129. Id. § 39-13-902(a)(1)–(16). 
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example, Oregon makes it a Class B violation to fly a drone over “the boundaries of 
privately-owned premises in a manner as to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 
harass or annoy the owner or occupant of the privately owned premises.”130  The law 
provides for stepped-up punishment after multiple violations.131  This nuisance 
approach does not require any privacy violation, but rather punishes annoyance or 
harassing behavior.  In fact, the law does not specify whether harassment and 
annoyance are meant to be judged by an objective or subjective standard.  Although 
the trespass approach creates an easier-to-administer bright-line rule, that clarity will 
necessarily sweep in legitimate newsgathering conduct that does severely infringe on 
privacy. 
States also modify existing criminal laws to apply to drones.  Kansas expanded 
its offense of harassment to include harassment “carried out through the use of a[] 
[drone] over or near any dwelling, occupied vehicle or other place where one may 
reasonably expect to be safe from uninvited intrusion or surveillance.”132  The 
offense requires “two or more separate acts over a period of time[.]”  However, the 
law also specifies that it does not prohibit “[c]onstitutionally protected activity[.]’”133  
Other states apply existing laws to the new reality of drones.  In lieu of passing new 
statutes specifically targeting drones, Alaska has distributed guidelines for drone 
use.134  These guidelines are non-binding, and simply circulate standards that drone 
operators should observe to respect the privacy of their neighbors.  They call, 
essentially, for being courteous and recognizing that some people expect more 
privacy than others.135  However, the guidelines also suggest that Alaska’s generally 
applicable statutes prohibiting “stalking” and “peeping Tom” activities also apply to 
commercial drone operators who photograph a house.136  At the same time, it makes 
clear that homeowners should not shoot down drones.137  Thus, states have also 
modified existing privacy laws or apply existing laws to the new context of drones. 
Finally, based on the Fourth Amendment concept of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy,138 states are adapting previously-enacted statutes to combat fears about 
voyeurism and other privacy infringements specifically from drone intrusions.  
Mississippi makes it a felony to look through a “window, hole, or opening” with a 
drone for the “lewd, licentious and indecent purpose of spying upon the occupant or 
 
 130. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.370(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 legislation). Cf. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (describing conduct required for private 
nuisance as “intentional and unreasonable” “invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment 
of land”).  
 131. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 837.370(3) (West, Westlaw through 2019 legislation) (stating that after 
one conviction, the offense is a Class A violation, and after two or more it’s a Class B misdemeanor).  
Utah has a similar criminal-trespass-by-drone law.  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206 (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 Gen. Sess.). 
 132. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-31a02(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of Kan. Leg.).  
 133. Id. § 60-31a02(d)(2). 
 134. UAS LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE, 29TH ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, Drone/UAS Operator 
Safety Guidelines and FAQs About Privacy (Oct. 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/4VUK-JFSR. 
 135. See id. at 3.  
 136. Id. at 11, 19. 
 137. Id. at 9. 
 138. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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occupants thereof” and also makes it a felony to photograph a person in such a 
scenario where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.139  With its focus 
on lewd purpose, this would likely steer clear of drone journalism.  Similar to 
Mississippi’s statute, Louisiana, Virginia, and Arkansas also require proving lewd 
purpose.140  However, Michigan’s statute sweeps more broadly than voyeurism to 
prohibit operating a drone to capture any “photographs, video, or audio recordings 
of an individual in a manner that would invade the individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”141  This prohibition is not limited to lewd voyeurism and 
seems to also prohibit journalism.  Another potential limitation, in addition to the 
voyeurism one, is to enact a law like California’s, which prohibits a physical invasion 
on private property where a drone operator knowingly captures “any type of visual 
image, sound recording, or other physical impression of a person engaging in a 
private, personal, or familial activity” that is offensive to a reasonable person.142  
Although this might limit collection of newsworthy stories like New Jersey Governor 
Chris Christie tanning with his family on a state beach that he closed,143 it would 
provide slightly more definite rules about the conduct that is acceptable.144 
3. Region-Specific Regulations 
In addition to the safety and privacy interests already discussed, states and 
localities may have interests specific to their locality that justify a region-specific 
regulation.  For example, New York City may be justified in enforcing a city-wide 
ban on private drone flight (except for five parks spread across Brooklyn, Queens, 
and Staten Island) based on the complexity of New York’s airspace.145  While this 
concern may not apply to Montana, that state may need to prohibit drones from 
interfering with wildfire suppression efforts because of a high incidence of wildfires, 
a concern not present in New York City.146  At the same time, Minnesota might want 
to appropriate $348,000 to assess drones’ environmental effects on the local moose 
 
 139. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-29-61(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 140. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-16-101(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of 92nd Ark. 
Gen. Assemb.), amended by 2019 ARK. ACTS 461; LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283(A)(1) (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-130.1 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 141. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 259.322(3) (Westlaw through P.A.2019, No. 57, of 2019 Reg. Sess., 
100th Leg.). 
 142. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 860 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).  
 143. See Gerry Mullany, Chris Christie Hits a Closed State Beach, and Kicks up a Fury, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/44NH-JVQQ.  Assume, for the purposes of the hypothetical, that the beach 
was private property. 
 144. Interestingly, the City of Hermosa Beach, California, enacted an ordinance that was intended 
to “supplement” California’s law by prohibiting capturing any photographs where there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  HERMOSA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE, ch. 9, § 38.040(H) (2016), 
https://perma.cc/9AQB-NVB7. 
 145. See Drones, NYC, https://portal.311.nyc.gov/article/?kanumber=KA-01541 (last visited Mar. 
21, 2019); Chris Glorioso, Erica Jorgensen & Evan Stulberger, Major Spike in Illegal Drones over New 
York, Pilot Recounts Close Encounters, NBC (Feb. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/B5QH-QNUT; see also 
Model Aircraft Fields, NYC PARKS, https://perma.cc/Z8XA-VV7Z (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). 
 146. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 76-13-214(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.).  
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population.147 
Many region-specific regulations of drones tend to focus on hunting fish and 
game.  These hunting regulations can be understood in three categories:  prohibitions 
on hunting or harassing wildlife and livestock,148 hunters using drones to gain an 
advantage,149 and drone operators interfering with hunters.150  Notably, in the third 
category, Tennessee and New Hampshire statutes also prohibit conducting “video 
surveillance” of hunters,151 which could be wielded against journalists.152  Therefore, 
even as region-specific regulations demonstrate local interests that cannot be 
regulated on a national scale, legislatures must consider drone journalism. 
In summary, state and local governments have legitimate interests in regulating 
drones based on safety, privacy, and region-specific concerns.  However, regulators 
should stay aware of the burdens these regulations place on journalists, particularly 
where a regulation restricts photography or publication.  Safety regulations should 
only impose operational restrictions to the extent necessary to promote safe drone 
use and, when possible, should provide the opportunity to obtain a waiver.  Region-
specific regulations should take a similar approach.  Other safety regulations could 
hinder the ability of drone journalists to produce content or conduct investigatory 
journalism.  For example, the ban of flight over correctional facilities or critical 
infrastructure could limit the ability of drone journalists to report on conditions at a 
prison or failures of a power plant. 
Privacy regulations can accommodate drone journalism in several ways based on 
the statutes on the books.  Privacy statutes can specifically exempt journalism from 
sanction, define invasions in narrow ways that do not encompass journalism (namely, 
voyeurism), or, as discussed later, incorporate a newsworthiness defense. 
Finally, regulators should be mindful of passing laws that grant discretion to shut 
down drone journalism.  One final regulation that could grant this sort of discretion 
is a California law that grants immunity to first responders who damage a drone while 
providing emergency services.153  This grant is limited to personnel providing 
medical, firefighting, and search and rescue services.154  However, an expansion of 
 
 147. 2017 MINN. SESS. LAW, S.F. No. 550, ch. 96, sec. 2, § 3(j). 
 148. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-308(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Gen. Sess.) (prohibiting 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly chasing, disturbing, or harming livestock with a drone); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 36-1101(b)(1)–(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of 65th Idaho Leg.) 
(prohibiting the use of drones for hunting or harassing animals, birds, or fur-bearing animals). 
 149. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 33.398 (2019) (prohibiting the use of drones to scout salmon 
for commercial fishing), http://perma.cc/28EC-LMA8; IND. CODE ANN. § 14-22-6-16 (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of 121st Gen. Assemb.) (prohibiting the use of drones to scout game during 
hunting season). 
 150. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.40112(2) (Westlaw through P.A.2019, No. 57, of the 2019 Reg. 
Sess., 100th Leg.); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/48-3(b)(10) (West, Westlaw through P.A.101-172) 
(establishing that it is a misdemeanor to interfere with a hunter lawfully “taking” wildlife by use of a 
drone). 
 151. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207:57(I) (West, Westlaw through ch. 345 of 2019 Reg. Sess.); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 70-4-302(a)(1), (6) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Extraordinary Sess. of 111th Tenn. 
Gen. Assemb.). 
 152. Cf. Part III.A (discussing the application of the First Amendment to “ag-gag” statutes). 
 153. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.101 (West, Westlaw through ch. 860 of 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 154. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 853 (West, Westlaw through ch. 860 of 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
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this immunity could infringe on a journalist’s ability to document police misconduct.  
While there are legitimate reasons for search and rescue personnel to ground a drone, 
this ability should not extend beyond the emergency context. 
C. ILLUSTRATION OF COMPREHENSIVE STATE REGULATION:  TEXAS 
Having examined state and local drone regulations promoting safety, privacy, and 
region-specific interests, I want to briefly discuss Texas’s regime for regulating 
drones.155  While some states have enacted only a few piecemeal pieces of legislation 
(or none at all) to regulate drones, Texas has enacted both safety and privacy 
legislation.  Therefore, it serves as a useful illustration of how a comprehensive state 
drone regulatory regime could look. 
First, Texas preempts local laws, except in the case of special events.  This is 
somewhat of a departure from the other preemption laws discussed above, but it 
provides some accommodation for the safety interests of temporary regulations.156  
In terms of safety, Texas prohibits flight over correctional facilities and sports venues 
(similar to Miami’s ordinance).157  Flying over a sports venue is a Class B 
misdemeanor.158  Texas also prohibits flight over critical infrastructure facilities if 
the drone is 400 feet (or lower) from the ground,159 which effectively bans 
commercial use unless the pilot has a waiver to fly above 400 feet. 
On the privacy front, Texas has a very similar privacy law to Tennessee’s.  The 
statute criminalizes using a drone to capture an image of an individual or privately-
owned real property with the “intent to conduct surveillance” on the individual or 
property, and also makes it an offense to distribute any such image.160  Although it 
provides exceptions to the law, journalists do not qualify for an exception.161  Texas 
has not enacted any of the alternative privacy regulations. 
These provisions place limitations on how journalists can use their drones.  For 
one, unless they have a waiver from the FAA, they cannot fly over anything defined 
as critical infrastructure.  They also may not fly over correctional facilities to report 
on potential abuses.162  These provisions are not subject to waiver or authorization.  
Furthermore, Texas’s privacy laws do not allow for a journalistic exception, and they 
make photography or publication of images punishable as various classes of 
misdemeanors.163  These provisions make drone journalism an uncertain proposition, 
 
 155. A press advocacy group recently challenged this regulatory scheme and, as of October 27, 2019, 
the case is pending. See Complaint, Nat’l Press Photographers Assoc. v. McCraw, 1:19-cv-00946-RP 
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2019), ECF No. 1. 
 156. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.009 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of 86th Leg.). 
 157. Id. §§ 423.0045, 423.0046; see supra notes 112 & 113 and accompanying text. 
 158. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.0046(d) (Vernon, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of 86th 
Leg.). 
 159. Id. § 423.0045(b)(1). 
 160. Id. §§ 423.003, 423.004.  
 161. Id. § 423.001(a)(1)–(19). 
 162. Cf. supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (describing BBC use of drones to record camps on 
United States-Mexico border). 
 163. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 423.003, 423.004 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of 
86th Leg). 
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given the undefined term of “intent to conduct surveillance.”  Finally, the preemption 
provision clarifies the state and local legal picture for a drone journalist, making it 
so she only needs to familiarize herself with federal and Texas laws and temporary 
local regulations.  Although the preemption provision simplifies the regulatory 
picture, Texas’s other provisions provide barriers to journalistic use of drones. 
III. PROMOTING SAFE DRONE USE WHILE ACCOMMODATING 
FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS 
The foregoing discussion of federal and state regulations enacted to preserve 
safety, privacy, and region-specific interests exhibits a complicated framework that 
journalists must navigate to use drones for content production and investigative 
reporting.  Part III will now examine regulations meant to promote safe drone flight 
while Part IV will focus on the state and local regulations that address privacy 
interests.164 
This Part first examines potential First Amendment challenges to the FAA’s 
regulatory scheme and reasons why the FAA’s scheme is likely subject to an 
intermediate tier of scrutiny.  While as-applied challenges remain available for 
instances where the FAA imposes pretextual restrictions that drive newsgathering 
activity from federally controlled airspace,165 a facial challenge to the FAA’s drone 
regulation seems unlikely to succeed and, ultimately, counterproductive where an 
errant drone might fall from the sky onto an unsuspecting bystander below.166  In an 
effort to streamline regulations, I propose preempting state and local safety 
regulations, except in the case of temporary restrictions for special events.  
Additionally, this Part also proposes that the FAA should establish a specialized 
waiver process for journalists. 
A. THE FAA’S COMMERCIAL DRONE REGULATIONS PASS INTERMEDIATE 
SCRUTINY 
Meant to preserve the safety of United States airspace, the FAA’s commercial 
drone regulations are likely not susceptible to a facial First Amendment challenge.  
However, regulation of newsgathering activities necessarily invokes First 
Amendment interests that must be considered when enacting these safety regulations.  
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the First Amendment protection 
 
 164. Although they provide interesting examples of idiosyncratic interests that motivate state and 
local legislatures, the region-specific regulations are not discussed further. 
 165. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 124, at 330 (describing no-fly zone over public protests in 
Ferguson, Missouri, as a pretextual prohibition); see also Jason Koebler, Drone Journalist Faces 7 Years 
in Prison for Filming Dakota Pipeline Protests, MOTHERBOARD (May 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/FC2H-
5EPS (the journalist was acquitted); Janus Kopfstein, Police Are Making It Impossible to Use Drones to 
Document Protests, VOCATIV (Jan. 27, 2017, 10:10 AM), https://perma.cc/DFH9-VQ9S. 
 166. Cf. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting) (expressing concern that in striking down labor union agency fees the Court “prevents the 
American people, acting through their state and local officials, from making important choices about 
workplace governance . . . by weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and 
in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy”). 
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afforded to drone newsgathering specifically or photography or videography167 
generally, such activity is likely protected and certainly implicates First Amendment 
interests that federal, state, and local drone regulators should accommodate. 
Dissenting in Branzburg v. Hayes, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that a “corollary” 
of the established “right to publish,” which he called “central to the First Amendment 
and basic to the existence of constitutional democracy” must be “the right to gather 
news.”168  Although the Branzburg majority decided not to extend an absolute right 
for a journalist to refuse revealing her sources to a grand jury, the majority similarly 
recognized that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment 
protections[.]”169  In a later case, the Court quoted Branzburg to say that “[t]here is 
an undoubted right to gather news ‘from any source by means within the law[.]’”170 
The burgeoning “right to record” partially supports First Amendment protection 
for drone photography.  Although the Supreme Court has not recognized the right to 
record, at least the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits recognize that 
citizens have a right to record police officers during the course of a law enforcement 
encounter.171  These cases typically start from the proposition that the “First 
Amendment protects film”172 and reason that, as a “corollary” “the First Amendment 
protects the act of making film” because “there is no fixed First Amendment line 
between the act of creating speech and the speech itself.”173  The element of police 
monitoring is an important one in “right to record” cases:  “Filming the police 
contributes to the public’s ability to hold the police accountable, ensure that police 
officers are not abusing their power, and make informed decisions about police 
policy.”174  Although district courts and lower state courts have extended the right to 
record outside of the police context,175 federal appellate court opinions generally 
tether their holdings to the police accountability rationale.176  At least one district 
court opinion has limited the right to record to police officers performing their 
duties.177  Another district court in a circuit without an established right to record, 
 
 167. Hereinafter, I refer to photography and videography collectively as “photography.” 
 168. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 169. Id. at 702 (majority opinion). 
 170. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681–82). 
 171. See Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2017); Fields v. City of 
Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83–84 (1st Cir. 2011); 
Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 
439 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); 
Komal S. Patel, Note, Testing the Limits of the First Amendment: How Online Civil Rights Testing is 
Protected Speech Activity, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1501–03 (2018); Kendall Jackson, Note, I Spy: 
Addressing the Privacy Implications of Live Streaming Technology and the Current Inadequacies of the 
Law, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 125, 141 (2017). 
 172. Turner, 848 F.3d at 688 n.40 (citing Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of State 
of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959)). 
 173. Id. at 689 n.41 (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 174. Id. at 689. 
 175. See Patel, supra note 171, at 1502–03.  For example, the New Jersey district court extended the 
right to record to monitoring and photographing the city’s mayor.  See Pomykacz v. Borough of West 
Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 (D.N.J. 2006). 
 176. See, e.g., Glik, 655 F.3d at 84. 
 177. Maple Heights News v. Lansky, No. 1:15CV53, 2017 WL 951426, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 
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while skeptical that the right to record existed, ruled that the right to record extends 
only to persons on the ground, and not to drones.178  The right-to-record cases 
emphasize the importance of recording law enforcement officials for accountability 
purposes in the age of ubiquitous recording devices.  These decisions demonstrate 
the First Amendment interests entangled with drone journalism.  However, given the 
uncertainty of their reach and lack of nationwide application, they need additional 
support. 
That support comes from another line of cases.  Although not yet considered by 
the Supreme Court, several courts have struck down so-called “ag-gag” statutes179 
that criminalize undercover reporting of animal abuses in “agricultural production 
facilit[ies.]”180  The Ninth Circuit determined that Idaho’s statute was invalid 
because it criminalized protected speech involved in entering a “production facility” 
through misrepresentation and “making audio or video recordings of the ‘conduct of 
an agricultural production facility’s operations.’”181  The federal district court in 
Utah found similar provisions proscribed protected speech.182  In evaluating whether 
recording is protected speech, the Ninth Circuit and District of Utah courts consulted 
the right-to-record cases.183  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit “easily dispose[d]” of the 
argument that “the act of creating an audiovisual recording is not speech protected 
by the First Amendment” because “[i]t defies common sense to disaggregate the 
creation of the video from the video or audio recording itself.”184  The Utah district 
court similarly conceptualized photography:  “[T]he act of recording is protectable 
First Amendment speech.”185  This broad view of the right to record is not tethered 
to an accountability rationale and applies to commercial drone journalism. 
Because expressive interests are involved in piloting a commercial drone for 
journalistic purposes, I consider the level of scrutiny that would be applied to the 
FAA’s drone regulations.  If strict scrutiny is applied, the FAA’s commercial drone 
regulations may not be narrowly tailored, but they surely serve the compelling 
governmental interest of promoting safety.186  However, the FAA’s commercial 
 
2017) (refusing to extend the right to record to a city council meeting). 
 178. Rivera v. Foley, No. 3:14–cv–00196, 2015 WL 1296258, at *10 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2015). 
 179. Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011), https://perma.cc/
NLW6-9VVM. 
 180. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of 65th Idaho Leg.), 
invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Animal Legal 
Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 353 F. Supp. 3d 812 (S.D. Iowa 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-1364 (8th. Cir. 
Feb. 22, 2019); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (D. Utah 2017); cf. Herbert, 
263 F. Supp. 3d at 1196–98 (describing the history of ag-gag laws). 
 181. Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1195, 1203. 
 182. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1201–08.  The court in the Southern District of Iowa dealt only 
with a misrepresentation prohibition.  Reynolds, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 821. 
 183. See Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1203–04; Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1206–08. 
 184. Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1203. 
 185. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1208.  This court was concerned with allowing the government to 
ban indirectly, for example, “music videos, or videos critical of the government, or any video at all” by 
proscribing their creation and, thus, effectively banning their distribution. 
 186. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231–32 (2015) (assuming traffic safety is a 
compelling interest); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997) (upholding fixed buffer 
zones outside of abortion clinics on the basis of, inter alia, “public safety and order”); Paris Adult Theater 
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drone regulations are content-neutral and, therefore, a lower level of scrutiny would 
apply to the federal regulations.  Unlike, for example, the ag-gag statutes which 
specifically proscribed “the subject matter of any audio or visual recordings of 
agricultural operations made without consent,”187 the FAA does not “defin[e] 
regulated speech by particular subject matter . . . [or] by its function or purpose.”188 
Instead, it prohibits any commercial use of a drone for any purpose if the drone is 
operated in an unsafe manner. 
To pass First Amendment intermediate scrutiny, a law must (1) further an 
important government interest, (2) that is unrelated to the suppression of free 
speech,189 in such a way that is (3) narrowly tailored, meaning that the “regulation 
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively 
absent the regulation.”190  Additionally, (4) the regulations must “leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication.”191  As discussed, air safety is an important 
(and almost certainly a compelling) interest that is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression.  Given the potential danger of a falling or errant drone, the FAA’s 
goals would be achieved less effectively without the regulations.  The regulation does 
not close the entire sky to drone journalism, and, therefore, leaves open channels of 
communication.192 
Alternatively, the commercial drone safety regulations bear some resemblance to 
the ecosystem of broadcast television that allowed Congress to impose the various 
Fairness Doctrine provisions at issue in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.193  In 
Red Lion, a radio broadcaster levied a First Amendment challenge against Fairness 
Doctrine provisions that regulated personal attacks and political editorializing in the 
context of controversial political issues.194  Although a content-based regulation 
 
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57–59 (1973) (justifying non-protected status of obscenity based on a state’s 
legitimate interests in “the quality of life and the total community of environment, the tone of commerce 
in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself”); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 
199–200 (1976) (stating “the protection of public health and safety represents an important function of 
state and local government” for the purpose of the equal protection intermediate scrutiny).  Although the 
FAA’s regulations do not serve the interest of promoting privacy, if privacy regulations were challenged 
and subject to strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court might similarly find protecting the privacy of the home 
to be a compelling governmental interest as well.  See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) 
(recognizing that the state’s interest in “protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home” is 
of the “highest order” because of the home’s “unique nature” as protecting the unwilling listener). 
 187. Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1204 (emphasis added). 
 188. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.  Facially content-neutral statutes will nevertheless be considered 
content-based if they “cannot be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” or if 
the government adopts the regulation “because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.”  
Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (alteration in original).  FAA 
regulations similarly do not satisfy these criteria. 
 189. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 190. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (citation omitted). 
 191. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 46 (1994). 
 192. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 81–82 (1949). 
 193. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).  The Fairness Doctrine was an FCC policy that required broadcast stations 
to cover matters of public importance in a manner that presented contrasting viewpoints on those matters. 
See generally Kathleen Ann Ruane, Fairness Doctrine: History and Constitutional Issues, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., July 13, 2011, https://perma.cc/6A89-Y4DA. 
 194. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 370–372.  
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would typically be afforded strict scrutiny, the Red Lion court applied a form of 
intermediate scrutiny and upheld the Fairness Doctrine provisions as constitutional 
because of “the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government’s role in allocating 
those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable without governmental 
assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views . . . .”195  
This environment of scarcity with an active governmental role in allocating space for 
various activities also resembles the problem of navigable airspace and the 
government’s role of deciding what aircraft can fly where and when.  These factors 
are important for describing Red Lion’s anomalous result.  Almost three decades 
later, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court held that Red Lion’s 
lower level of scrutiny did not apply to cable television because the problems of 
spectrum scarcity, signal interference, and the government’s regulatory role did not 
exist for cable.196 
Finally, several scholars and commentators have considered whether the FAA’s 
regulations are impermissible regulations of First Amendment activity in a public 
forum.197  The Supreme Court has established three different types of public 
forums—  traditional, designated, and limited (also called “nonpublic”)—in which 
the government may enact reasonable, content-neutral restrictions on time, place, and 
manner that meet additional criteria.198  Different restrictions on regulations attach 
to the different types of public forums.199 
 
 195. Id. at 386, 400–01. Although the FCC later declined to enforce the Fairness Doctrine, finding 
it unconstitutional, Ruane, supra note 193, at 7 (citing In re Complaint of Syracuse Peach Council against 
Television Station WTVH, Syracuse, New York, 2 FCC RCD. 5043 (1987)), that does not diminish the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning that scarcity and an active governmental role may diminish the level of 
scrutiny applied to a regulation of speech within that environment of scarcity, see Turner Broad. Sys. v. 
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638 (1994) (declining to question the “continuing validity” of the “scarcity rationale” 
for “our broadcast jurisprudence”). 
 196. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 638–40  (“[T]he special physical characteristics of the broadcast 
market . . . underlie our broadcast jurisprudence.”). 
 197. See Shane, supra note 124; Blitz, Grimsley, Henderson & Thai, supra note 124, at 49; Love, 
Lawson & Holton, supra note 5, at 22.  Notably, the regulatory landscape has changed significantly from 
2015, when the FAA banned all commercial drone flight with a few exceptions.  That blanket ban 
presented a much closer constitutional question than the status quo.  See id. at 57–58. 
 198. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998); see also Perry Educ. 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“The state may also enforce regulations 
of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”).  
 199. Traditional public forums, “streets and parks which ‘have immemorially been held in trust for 
the use of the public,’” are subject to the strictest restrictions on what the government can regulate, where 
any regulation must be “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end,” or, as discussed, be a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.  Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.  The 
government creates designated public forums when it intends to make property not traditionally open for 
debate available for “expressive use by the general public or by a particular class of speakers.”  Arkansas 
Educ. Television Com’n, 460 U.S. at 677–78; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (“[W]hen the Government has intentionally designated a place or means 
of communication as a public forum speakers cannot be excluded without a compelling governmental 
interest.”).  Unlike a traditional public forum, the government may close a designated public forum to 
expressive activity whenever it chooses.  See Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 
489 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46).  The government may also create a forum “limited 
to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects” and may impose 
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Cynthia Love and her co-authors agree with Beth Shane that airspace should be 
considered a traditional public forum.200  However, Marc Blitz and his co-authors 
note the Court’s reluctance to “update the category of traditional public forums to 
protect modern spaces where the public may assemble and exchange ideas, including 
public airports and Internet terminals[,]”201 and, while noting the analytical 
difficulties of considering when private and public airspace begin,202 suggested that 
navigable airspace is a limited public forum.203  Shane writes that the FAA’s current 
regulations would fail public forum analysis as a content-based restriction on speech 
in a traditional public forum.204  Because they assume navigable airspace is a limited 
public forum, Blitz and his co-authors argue that reasonable manner restrictions 
related to safety like limitations “on the altitude, speed . . . proximity to other aircraft 
or to airports . . . [and] on the qualifications of an operator” are permissible as 
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.205  Assuming drone photography is 
protected as First Amendment speech, it seems tempting to combat any restrictions 
imposed.  However, the FAA’s safety restrictions (and the growing availability of 
waivers and possible further loosening of regulations) resemble time, place, or 
manner restrictions rather than content-based limitations. 
The FAA’s drone safety regulations are likely not subject to strict scrutiny in a 
facial First Amendment challenge.  However, commercial drone journalism involves 
significant First Amendment interests that call for the FAA to make commercial 
drone regulations as closely tailored as possible to accomplish its safety goals while 
accommodating journalism, as a matter of policy. 
B. REJECTING “DRONE FEDERALISM” IN FAVOR OF PREEMPTION 
As a policy matter, preemption of state and local safety regulations would 
streamline the regulatory scheme applicable to drone journalism.  Although Congress 
has not explicitly preempted state and local safety regulations, courts should 
nevertheless find implied preemption because the FAA’s safety regulations indicate 
a Congressional intent to occupy the field of commercial drone safety regulations.  
While a finding of implied preemption with respect to state and local safety 
regulations raises the question of whether that preemption extends to state and local 
 
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restrictions on speech.  Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 
460, 470 (2009); see also Blitz, Grimsley, Henderson & Thai, supra note 124, at 114–16 (explaining the 
doctrinal differences between limited and nonpublic forums but deciding to refer to them interchangeably 
because “the Court has so far assigned the same test to them”).  Indeed, discrimination against a speaker 
based on viewpoint is not permissible in any public forum.  See Summum, 555 U.S. at 469–70.  
 200. Shane, supra note 124, at 338–41; Love, Lawson & Holton, supra note 5, at 55–57. 
 201. Blitz, Grimsley, Henderson & Thai, supra note 124, at 112. 
 202. Blitz, Grimsley, Henderson & Thai, supra note 124, at 123–25; see also infra Part III.B; cf. 
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946). 
 203. Blitz, Grimsley, Henderson & Thai, supra note 124, at 125. 
 204. Shane, supra note 124, at 341–44 (2018).  Love et al., similarly, find that the pre-Part 107 ban 
on commercial drone flight fails public forum analysis.  Love, Lawson & Holton, supra note 5, at 57–58.  
However, because the regulations have changed to allow commercial drone use with restrictions, this 
analysis no longer holds. 
 205. Blitz, Grimsley, Henderson & Thai, supra note 124, at 126–27. 
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privacy statutes and state tort laws,206 Congress and the FAA have shown an intent 
to prescribe regulations for commercial drone safety.  These safety regulations 
contribute to Congress’s overall goal to safely and effectively introduce drones into 
the national airspace system.  The extension of federal supremacy of drone safety 
regulations follows logically from the federal government’s historical control of 
airspace.  Federal preemption of state and local drone safety regulations would 
simplify the regulatory scheme applicable to drone journalists. 
1. Congressional Considerations of Preempting State and Local Drone Laws 
Generally, federal aviation regulations preempt state and local regulations,207 and 
at least one court has recognized that those preemption principles extend to drones.208  
Additionally, Congress has considered several preemption schemes.209  However, 
those plans might actually complicate the regulatory picture for drone journalists, 
and this Note proposes an alternative route forward.  Before the 2018 Act was passed, 
two proposed Congressional bills considered preemption.  Additionally, Senator 
Edward J. Markey proposed a bill that would regulate privacy by requiring a 
submission of a data collection plan with any drone registration.210 
First, Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced the Drone Federalism Act of 2017 to 
explicitly increase the power of state and local governments to regulate drones.211  
Cosponsored by a bipartisan group of senators (Senators Richard Blumenthal, Mike 
Lee, and Tom Cotton) the Drone Federalism Act would have made illegal the 
operation of a drone within 200 feet of property,212 and would have limited federal 
preemption “to the extent necessary to ensure the safety and efficacy of the national 
airspace system for interstate commerce” while preserving “legitimate interests of 
State, local, and tribal governments” including safety, privacy, property rights, land 
use, and restrictions on nuisances and noise pollution.213  This bill would surely 
further embolden state and local governments to pass regulations in excess of FAA 
requirements, thus complicating the picture for drone journalists. 
Second, the Drone Innovation Act of 2017, also cosponsored by a bipartisan group 
(Representatives Jason Lewis, Julia Brownley, Todd Rokita, John Garamendi, and 
Grace F. Napolitano) took a slightly different tack.  Instead of establishing a drone 
trespass law or expressly preempting federal law at a certain height, the Drone 
Innovation Act calls on the Secretary of Transportation to collaborate with state, 
 
 206. See infra Part IV.A. 
 207. See infra notes 234–240 and accompanying text. 
 208. See infra notes 241–244 and accompanying text. 
 209. See infra notes 210–218 and accompanying text. 
 210. Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2017, S. 631, 115th Cong. (2017), https://
perma.cc/5E6P-NSRA.  Sen. Markey has recently renewed his call for federal privacy protections.  Press 
Release, Senator Ed Markey, Senator Markey Calls for Privacy Protections in Wake of FAA Drone 
Proposal (Jan. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/83UP-ZXU2. 
 211. Drone Federalism Act of 2017, S. 1272, 115th Cong. (introduced May 25, 2017), https://
perma.cc/B8BD-SZ2K. 
 212. Id. § 3. 
 213. Id. § 2(a)(1)–(2). 
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local, and tribal stakeholders to establish a local operational framework that would 
standardize state, local, and tribal regulations.214  The framework would provide 
guidelines for state and local governments to “creat[e] an environment that is 
hospitable to innovation and fosters the rapid integration of unmanned aircraft into 
the national airspace system” and to “harmonize” regulations “that are local in 
nature.”215  The bill lays out considerations that the framework should consider,216 
provides that the FAA should not issue a rule that would impede state or local 
governments’ ability to define property rights,217 and states that state and local 
governments may not “unreasonably or substantially impede” drones from taking off 
by, for example, passing an outright ban on flight or making flight nearly impossible 
by overregulation.218  These approaches do not accommodate drone journalism 
because they would allow states to impose draconian restrictions and would 
complicate the regulatory scheme, thus increasing compliance costs.  Congress 
should step in and explicitly state what it has implied:  The FAA’s drone safety 
regulations, like the federal government’s modern-day supremacy in navigable 
airspace, preempt state and local drone safety regulations. 
2. Historical Roots of Federal Airspace Sovereignty 
Historically, property owners controlled the airspace over their property.  At 
common law, the “maxim of the law” was that the ownership of real property 
extended “an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards” and that “the word 
‘land’ includes not only the face of the earth, but everything under it, or over it.”219  
The ad coelum doctrine meant that an action that infringed on someone’s land from 
above or below was a trespass.220  This concept was imported into American 
common law.221 
However, as the use of airplanes increased in the middle of the twentieth century, 
the old ad coelum doctrine gave way to the new technological reality.  In United 
States v. Causby, the Supreme Court held that an unbounded ad coelum rule “has no 
place in the modern world” because Congress has declared that “[t]he air is a public 
highway[.]”222  Therefore, maintaining the old principle would subject every 
 
 214. Drone Innovation Act of 2017, H.R. 2930, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017), https://perma.cc/MD48-
AQV9. 
 215. Id. § 3(b). 
 216. Id. § 3(c)–(d). 
 217. Id. § 5(c). But see infra Part IV.C. 
 218. Id. § 5(d). 
 219. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18; see also EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF 
THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, bk. 1, ch. 1, § 1, at 4r (London, Society of Stationers 1628) 
(“[T]he earth hath in law a great extent upwards, not only of water as hath been said, but of aire, and all 
other things even up to heaven, for cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum[.]”); Ad Coelum Doctrine, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the term as “[t]he common-law rule that a 
landowner holds everything above and below the land, up to the sky and down to the earth’s core, 
including all minerals”). 
 220. See KEITH N. HYLTON, TORT LAW: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE 55 (2016). 
 221. See id.; see also Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 222. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). 
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transcontinental flight to “countless trespass suits.”223  However, while establishing 
this “general principle,” the Court held that the government may have taken a 
prescriptive easement where military aircraft “frequent[ly]” and “regular[ly]” flew 
eighty-three feet over a chicken farm.224  The Court recognized that, while “the 
airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the inconveniences which it 
causes are normally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment,” a landowner 
must have “exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping 
atmosphere” of her property to have full enjoyment of the land.225  The Court did not 
define “immediate reaches” but said that a taking would occur when an interference 
was “so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and 
use of the land.”226  Although Causby’s establishment of federal preemption of state 
tort law claims for trespass is most relevant for the foregoing discussion, these 
takings principles are relevant in considering how far federal preemption extends.  In 
addition to Causby, the statute provides that the federal government “has exclusive 
sovereignty of airspace of the United States” and that the FAA has authority to 
“establish security provisions that will encourage and allow maximum use of the 
navigable airspace by civil aircraft consistent with national security.”227 
3. Preemption Principles and Navigable Airspace 
Federal preemption of state and local laws finds its basis in the Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause.228  While federal preemption is a relatively recent innovation in 
some fields of law like products liability,229 the proposition that state laws conflicting 
with federal laws are “without effect” has a long and storied history.230  Courts apply 
two distinct types of preemption.  First, when Congress has expressly preempted state 
statutory and common law claims, a Court will find express preemption, subject to 
limitations.231  Second, even if Congress has not expressly preempted state law 
claims, a court may find one of the two flavors of implied preemption:  (1) field 
preemption, where a court infers that Congress intended to dominate a given area of 
law because the federal regulatory scheme is “so pervasive” that Congress “left no 
 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 258, 261, 274–75.  For a discussion of “avigation easements,” see JON W. BRUCE & JAMES 
W. ELY, Jr., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN LAND § 5:35. 
 225. Causby, 328 U.S. at 264, 266 (emphasis added). 
 226. Id. at 266. 
 227. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1), (b)(3) (2012). 
 228. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 229. See HYLTON, supra note 220, at 372 (citing Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 
1988)).  
 230. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 479–80 (2013) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. 316, 427 (1819)).  
 231. While “[i]t is accepted that Congress has the authority, in exercising its Article I powers, to pre-
empt state law[,]” California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989), express preemption provisions 
should be construed narrowly “in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of state police power 
regulations.”  Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992). 
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room for the States to supplement it” and the federal interests are so “dominant” that 
the federal system is “assumed” to preclude state laws;232 or (2) conflict preemption, 
which addresses state law that renders impossible simultaneous compliance with 
state and federal law or “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”233 
The Court has determined that Congress intends to occupy the entire field of 
aircraft regulation, with the exception of activities that may incidentally burden air 
travel like special taxes on aircraft.  In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 
Inc., the Court held that the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise Control Act 
preempted a city ordinance that prohibited jet aircraft takeoffs between 11:00 p.m. 
and 7:00 a.m.234  The Court reasoned in that case, “the pervasive nature of the scheme 
of federal regulation of aircraft noise . . . leads us to conclude that there is [field] pre-
emption.”235  Upholding the ordinance could “severely limit the flexibility of FAA 
in controlling air traffic flow” which would cause congestion and decrease safety.236  
Discussing the pervasive federal control of airplanes in navigable airspace, the Court 
quoted a previous case: 
Federal control is intensive and exclusive.  Planes do not wander about in the sky like 
vagrant clouds.  They move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, 
in the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal 
commands.  The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and 
detailed system of controls.237 
In an earlier case, the Court explained that an airplane’s propensity for quickly 
“escap[ing] the bounds of local regulative competence called for a more penetrating, 
uniform and exclusive regulation by the nation than had been thought appropriate for 
the more easily controlled commerce of the past.”238  The Court distinguished 
airplanes from land and sea vehicles because of the way they “burst suddenly upon 
modern governments, offering new advantages, demanding new rights and carrying 
new threats which society could meet with timely adjustments only by prompt 
invocation of legislative authority.”239  However, preemption of state regulations of 
aircraft in flight does not extend to preempt a special state tax on aircraft that lands 
a certain number of times in the state.240  These cases show broad preemption of state 
regulations that call to regulate aircraft flight in navigable airspace. 
 
 232. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
203–04 (1983) (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)). 
 233. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 100–101. 
 234. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639–40 (1973). 
 235. Id. at 633–34. 
 236. Id. at 639. 
 237. Id. at 633–34 (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., 
concurring)). 
 238. Chi. & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 107–08 (1948). 
 239. Id. at 107–08. 
 240. See Braniff Airways v. Neb. State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954),  
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4. Airspace Preemption Applied to State and Local Drone Safety Regulations 
In this tradition, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts struck down 
portions of a city drone ordinance two years ago.  In Singer v. City of Newton, the 
court found that provisions of Newton’s ordinance that “essential[ly]” banned 
commercial and recreational drone flight “within the limits of Newton” were subject 
to conflict preemption.241  The court struck down provisions applicable to both 
recreational and commercial drone use that imposed limitations on allowable flight 
altitude, registration requirements, and visual line of sight requirements, in excess of 
FAA regulations.242  Although the court found that the FAA had not sought to occupy 
the entire field of drone regulation (and therefore that field preemption did not apply) 
because the FAA contemplated state or local privacy regulation of drones,243 it struck 
down the challenged provisions of the Newton ordinance that protected safety 
interests.244  Singer provides a rubric for thinking about federal preemption of drone 
regulations. 
The two Congressional proposals advanced in 2017 that concern explicit 
preemption of some state and local drone regulations merit brief consideration.  An 
explicit preemption of state and local safety regulations would certainly clarify that 
drone journalists only need be mindful of federal safety regulations, special event 
regulations, and regulations related to privacy.  Such an explicit preemption would 
reduce compliance costs and the coinciding burdens on journalists.  Congress should 
seriously consider making its implicit intention to occupy the field of drone safety 
regulations an explicit pronouncement upon which journalists can rely. 
However, neither of the proposed bills would accomplish this goal.  Both Senator 
Dianne Feinstein’s Drone Federalism Act of 2017 and Representative Jason Lewis’s 
Drone Innovation Act of 2017 would ensure that no federal regulations are 
preempted below 200 feet, while Feinstein’s Act would expand this to allowing state 
regulation within 200 feet of any structure.  Both bills preserve state and local 
governments’ ability to pass regulations for public safety.  Representative Lewis’s 
proposal to create a local policy framework could promote uniformity in drone safety 
regulations but would not expressly preempt state and local safety laws. 
Recognizing that some local governments may have heightened security interests, 
Congress could create some process by which local governments can apply for 
particular security regulations.  The FAA would review them and, if they were 
deemed necessary, they could be published in the centralized DroneZone portal 
where commercial drone operators could easily view additional safety regulations.  
After that, drone operators could seek airspace authorizations of these additional 
security regulations through the preexisting LAANC tool.245 
 
 241. Singer v. City of Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d 125, 130–33 (D. Mass 2017), appeal dismissed per 
stipulation, No. 17-2045, 2017 WL 8942575 (1st Cir. Dec. 7, 2017). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 130. 
 244. Id. at 131–34. 
 245. Currently, the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) tool allows 
drone operators to apply for an “instant authorization” (a temporary status) to fly in controlled airspace. 
LAANC is accessible through the “DroneZone” portal or a third-party app.  See supra note 81 and 
FISCHER, PRIORITIZING JOURNALISM IN COMMERCIAL DRONE REGULATION, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 107 (2019) 
138 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [43:1 
Even if Congress does not expressly preempt state and local drone safety 
regulations as a matter of policy, courts should still find implied preemption.  Implied 
preemption of state and local drone safety regulations fits into a line of cases about 
Congressional preemption of state and local restrictions on manned aircraft in and 
around navigable airspace.  The Singer court found implied conflict preemption 
because Newton’s restrictions made commercial drone flight impossible—in 
contradiction of the FAA’s safety regulations.  The court did not find implied field 
preemption because the FAA did not seek to regulate privacy and left that arena open 
to the states.  However, courts could also theorize that Congress intended to occupy 
the field of general drone safety regulations but to leave open the field of privacy 
regulations for state and local governments.  Either theory allows for a finding that 
Congress implicitly intended to preempt state and local drone safety requirements. 
The prospect of courts finding implied preemption of state and local safety 
regulations raises two additional questions for courts to solve:  First, what happens 
to temporary flight restrictions imposed because of special events and, second, can 
federal drone safety regulations cover the “immediate reaches” of property without 
constituting a taking? 
First, state and local regulations of drone flights for special events may survive 
preemption.  Although the FAA imposes some temporary airspace restrictions,246 the 
limited treatment of these temporary restrictions in its regulations does not evince an 
intention to occupy the field for field preemption.247  Conflict preemption presents a 
closer question, but an appropriately tailored process that still allows for commercial 
operation compliant with FAA rules could possibly survive.  Therefore, to best 
accommodate drone journalists, state or local procedures for imposing temporary 
restrictions based on special events should follow a prescribed process, provide 
sufficient notice to drone photographers, and allow journalists and photographers to 
obtain waivers of the prohibitions.  Miami’s special events safety regulation serves 
as a good illustration.248  To avoid preemption concerns and accommodate the 
existing FAA waiver process, any special events grant of authority could provide an 
exception for flight that is otherwise valid under FAA standards.249  Given these 
considerations, special event safety regulations are likely permissible if properly 
tailored. 
Second, federal safety regulations extending from heaven (or, for most 
 
accompanying text. 
 246. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 247. See FAA Air Traffic and General Operating Rules, 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.43–47 (2019). 
 248. See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text. 
 249. The Miami ordinance provides such an exception.  MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-12(e) (2019), 
https://perma.cc/5SQU-LU9B (“Notwithstanding the prohibitions set forth in this section, nothing in this 
section shall be construed to prohibit, limit, or otherwise restrict any person who is authorized by the 
Federal Aviation Administration to operate small unmanned aircraft in any city air space, pursuant to 
Sections 331–336 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 or certificate of waiver, certificate 
of authorization, or airworthiness certificate under section 44704 of Title 49 of United States Code or 
other Federal Aviation Administration grant of authority for a specific flight operation or operations, from 
conducting such operation(s) in accordance with the authority granted by the Federal Aviation 
Administration.”).  A commonsense reading of this exception seems like it would allow a commercial 
drone operator with a valid flight-over-people waiver to fly during a declared special event. 
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commercial drone operators without an altitude waiver, 400 feet) to earth would not 
constitute a taking of the “immediate reaches” of real property.  Causby rejected the 
traditional notion of preemption of trespass law in aircraft flight because of the 
pervasive nature of noisy aircraft frequently taking off eighty-three feet above Mr. 
Causby’s chicken farm.  Although it’s true that drones have the ability to fly below 
eighty-three feet, the prospect of commercial drone safety regulations allowing 
drones to fly close to property is not sufficiently particularized to any specific 
landowner to raise concerns of a takings claim.250  To the extent that commercial 
drone flight may infringe on someone’s privacy in their property, that issue is for 
consideration as a privacy regulation and not as a safety one.  Therefore, the concern 
about extending drones into the immediate reaches of property is not properly 
considered as an objection to preemption of state and local safety regulations. 
C. A PROPOSAL FOR A COMPLEMENTARY IMPROVEMENT TO THE WAIVER 
PROCESS 
Aside from explicitly preempting state and local drone safety laws, Congress can 
better facilitate drone journalism through other legislative enactments.  For example, 
Congress could create a specific waiver process for drone journalists.  This waiver 
process would not waive portions of the FAA’s commercial drone safety rules that 
are not waivable for the general public, but it could provide a fee waiver or expedited 
processing of waiver applications.  Congress and federal agencies have provided for 
similar accommodations in other areas.  For example, the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) provides for expedited processing and fee waivers in the face of 
demonstrated compelling need.251  While definitional concerns would likely be 
raised, the expedited processing for a drone journalism statute could crib its 
definition of “representative of the news media” from the FOIA statute.252  Of course, 
 
 250. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (requiring “concrete and particularized 
injury” to establish standing); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (lacking standing to 
litigate a generalized political grievance); cf. Flores v. Texas, No. 5:16–CV–130, 2017 WL 1397126, at 
*4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2017) (finding that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge provision of Texas drone 
law that deprived him of civil action based on his property’s proximity to the international border). 
 251. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II) (2018) (stating that “fees shall be limited to reasonable standard 
charges for document duplication when records are not sought for commercial use and the request is 
made . . . a representative of the news media”); id. § 552(a)(6)(E) (calling for agencies to promulgate 
regulations “providing for expedited processing of requests for records” in cases where an applicant has a 
compelling need). 
 252. That definition is as follows:  
[A]ny person or entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses 
its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an 
audience. In this clause, the term ‘news’ means information that is about current events or that 
would be of current interest to the public.  Examples of news-media entities are television or radio 
stations broadcasting to the public at large and publishers of periodicals (but only if such entities 
qualify as disseminators of ‘news’) who make their products available for purchase by or 
subscription by or free distribution to the general public.  These examples are not all-inclusive.  
Moreover, as methods of news delivery evolve (for example, the adoption of the electronic 
dissemination of newspapers through telecommunications services), such alternative media shall 
be considered to be news-media entities.  A freelance journalist shall be regarded as working for a 
news-media entity if the journalist can demonstrate a solid basis for expecting publication through 
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commenters identify issues with FOIA’s expedited processing clause,253 but if an 
expedited waiver process for journalists was implemented correctly it could ensure 
that drone journalists are able to get off the ground more quickly and at less expense.  
The FAA already considers the interests of drone journalists, shown by its 
implementation of the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability 
(LAANC) program that allows drone operators to obtain “instant authorization” to 
fly in controlled airspace.254  Furthermore, this journalistic accommodation mirrors 
the solicitude courts have for newsgathering activities in other contexts.255  This 
special status for drone journalists could better accommodate drone journalism while 
maintaining the FAA’s existing safety scheme. 
IV. CRAFTING STATE AND LOCAL PRIVACY REGULATIONS TO 
PRIVILEGE NEWSGATHERING 
Federal preemption of state and local safety regulations raises the question of 
whether preemption extends to state and local privacy regulations and state privacy 
tort law claims.  Keeping the goal of simplifying the federal and state regulatory 
picture facing drone journalists in mind, preemption of the full suite of state and local 
privacy laws would doubtlessly lead to a regulatory picture that is easier to 
comprehend.  However, I contend that these regulations are not preempted by federal 
law because Congress has not evinced the intention to occupy the field of drone 
privacy regulations (yet) and complying with state and local privacy regulations does 
not make compliance with federal regulations impossible. 
At the same time, state and local governments do not need to operate in a vacuum 
when crafting drone privacy statutes.  These governments can draw on guidelines 
stemming from a body of common and constitutional law that balances privacy and 
newsgathering interests.  Furthermore, several statutes already enacted may fail First 
Amendment scrutiny.  These aspects of state and local privacy regulations are 
considered in turn. 
A. FEDERAL SAFETY REGULATIONS DO NOT PREEMPT STATE AND LOCAL 
PRIVACY REGULATIONS 
The Federal Aviation Administration’s current drone regulations do not explicitly 
or implicitly preempt state and local drone privacy regulations or state privacy torts.  
 
that entity, whether or not the journalist is actually employed by the entity.  A publication contract 
would present a solid basis for such an expectation; the Government may also consider the past 
publication record of the requester in making such a determination. 
Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii). 
 253. See, e.g., Erin Carroll, Why FOIA’s Speed Clause is Broken, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 
15, 2015), https://perma.cc/3T4D-J2A4.   
 254. See Drone Journalists Get Very Good News – Instant Waivers, POYNTER (July 19, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/KD6D-4WRU; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 255. See, e.g., Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977); CNN v. Trump, 1:18-cv-02610-
TJK (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2018), transcript granting TRO, https://perma.cc/6ASY-R3MJ; see also David A. 
Fischer, Jim Acosta’s First Amendment Defense, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS BEAT (Nov. 16, 2018), https://
perma.cc/3HTN-BMSJ. 
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Explicit preemption occurs when Congress explicitly indicates an intent to preempt 
state and local laws; such express preemption provisions are generally interpreted 
narrowly.256  Congress has not expressly preempted any state or local regulation of 
drones.  The two types of implied preemption are field preemption, which occurs 
when Congress indicates an intention to occupy an entire field of regulation without 
leaving room for state and local governments to regulate, and conflict preemption, 
which occurs when state regulation contradicts federal regulation or would make 
complying with federal regulation impossible.257 
As discussed above, Congress and the FAA have indicated an intent to occupy the 
field of drone safety regulation.258  However, because Congress does not empower 
the FAA to promulgate drone privacy regulations and because the agency itself 
disclaims responsibility for privacy regulations with respect to drones, state and local 
privacy regulations are not preempted.259  Indeed, the Singer court found that the city 
of Newton’s safety regulations were preempted by federal law but that the FAA had 
left room for state and local governments to regulate privacy issues related to 
drones.260  At the same time, this could change in the future if Senator Edward J. 
Markey revives his push for a federal drone privacy regulation.261  A regime with 
uniform safety and privacy regulations would be preferable for reforming the 
regulatory environment to best accommodate drone journalists, but that is not the 
current status quo. 
State privacy tort law claims are also not preempted by the FAA’s drone safety 
regulations.  Federal regulations preempt state tort law claims when a federal 
regulatory agency thoroughly considers the costs and benefits of a proposed 
regulation with a greater degree of expertise than a court would be able.262  The FAA 
has not considered the privacy tradeoffs of drones at all, and, therefore, a state 
privacy tort claim would be able to proceed. 
B. BALANCING NEWSGATHERING AND PRIVACY AT COMMON AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Because federal drone safety regulations do not preempt state privacy tort actions, 
these common law actions are available against drone journalists.  Two of Prosser’s 
four privacy torts are most relevant to drone journalism.263 
First, the intrusion on seclusion tort assigns liability where “[o]ne . . . intentionally 
 
 256. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra notes 232–233 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra Part III.B. 
 259. See supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text. 
 260. Singer v. City of Newton, 284 F. Supp. 3d 125, 130–34 (D. Mass. 2017), appeal dismissed per 
stipulation, No. 17-2045, 2017 WL 8942575 (1st Cir. Dec. 7, 2017). 
 261. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 262. Compare Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 877–81 (2000) with Williamson v. 
Mazda Motor of Am., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011); see also HYLTON, supra note 220, at 375–76. 
 263. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (identifying privacy torts as 
(1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) publicity which places plaintiff in 
a false light; (4) appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness for defendant’s advantage); see also Samuel 
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
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intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his 
private affairs or concerns . . . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.”264  The Restatement comments clarify that the intrusion may be 
“with or without mechanical aids” and does not require publication to be 
actionable.265  This tort penalizes the specific act of intruding upon private affairs in 
a highly offensive way, without regard to whether the fruits of such intrusion are 
ultimately published.  It could sweep in legitimate drone journalism, without regard 
for whether it is ultimately published.  It also seems to mirror state prohibitions on 
intrusions where someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy and has a broader 
definition than the state voyeurism statutes.266  However, the bar is somewhat high 
because it requires a “substantial” interference and would likely not include 
something like accidentally photographing someone’s property from the air while 
covering a hurricane, or the like.267 
Next, the public disclosure of private facts tort actually involves publication of 
private facts.  The tort subjects to liability anyone “who gives publicity to a matter 
concerning the private life of another . . . if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern 
to the public.”268  Whether a disclosed private fact is “highly offensive” should be 
evaluated “relative to the customs of the time and place” and will only give rise to 
liability when a reasonable person “would feel justified in feeling seriously 
aggrieved” by the disclosure.269  Furthermore, as the second element of the tort 
indicates, the tort is unavailable when the disclosure concerns a matter of “legitimate 
public concern,” or, in other words, is newsworthy.270  Therefore, this particular tort 
takes account of legitimate newsgathering on matters of public concern. 
Newsworthiness is typically a malleable standard that examines whether a 
disclosed fact concerns a matter of legitimate public concern.  “The common law has 
long recognized that the public has a proper interest in learning about many matters,” 
and, accordingly, a newsworthy disclosure is not a tortious one.271  The bar for 
newsworthiness is lower in cases of public figures, where legitimate matters of public 
concern may extend beyond the reason why the person is a public figure, within 
reason.272  Whether something is “news” depends on “the mores of the community” 
and how “publishers and broadcasters have defined the term” as long as something 
has “genuine, . . . popular appeal.”273  Finally, facts that are more private become 
 
 264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST., 1965). 
 265. Id. cmt. b. 
 266. See supra note 139–140. 
 267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. cmt. c (“Complete privacy does not exist in this world except in a desert, and anyone who 
is not a hermit must expect and endure the ordinary incidents of the community life of which he is a part.”).  
As drones become more pervasive, it seems that it would become less possible to evoke this particular 
tort.  See supra note 124. 
 270. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (citing Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469 (1975)). 
 271. Id. 
 272. See id. cmts. e, f. 
 273. Id. cmt. g. 
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matters of legitimate interest as figures become more known.274  Although the 
standard has some flexibility, this common law balancing of newsworthiness and 
privacy can inform how drone privacy laws are regulated to account for 
newsgathering interests. 
The Supreme Court has also considered newsworthiness defenses to disclosures 
of private and sensitive information in a constitutional context.  These cases set out 
principles for state and local governments to draw from when crafting their 
regulations.  One principle is that “interests in privacy fade when the information 
involved already appears on the public record” and, to avoid “timidity and self-
censorship” a rule shouldn’t make public records generally available but forbid 
publication if the facts are offensive to a reasonable person.275  The Supreme Court 
drew on this principle for a number of sensitive factual scenarios:  striking down an 
injunction that prohibited newspapers from publishing the name and picture of a 
subject of a juvenile proceeding where the hearing was open to the public;276 
publishing information about juvenile offenders gathered by monitoring police band 
radio frequencies and interviewing eyewitnesses;277 and disallowing a damage award 
where the newspaper obtained the name of rape victim from a publicly released 
police report.278  Similarly, protecting the reputation of state judges was not 
sufficiently compelling to support a state statute that barred the publication of details 
about a pending investigation of a state judge.279  These cases indicate how 
newsworthiness can overcome expectations of privacy.  While an application of a 
state drone privacy statute against a newsworthy disclosure might fail on 
constitutional grounds, state and local policymakers would do well to explicitly 
exempt newsworthy disclosures from privacy statutes.  This standard would draw 
standards of newsworthiness found in common and constitutional law.  While a 
journalist may win when a case goes to the Supreme Court, the unpredictability of 
judging and the limited bank accounts of publications and journalists counsel for a 
statutory rule that would privilege newsworthy disclosures gathered by drone. 
C. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL DRONE PRIVACY 
REGULATIONS 
Finally, several state regulations may be unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.  First, Tennessee’s and Texas’s statutes forbidding publication of drone 
footage captured with an “intent to conduct surveillance” raise constitutional 
questions in some circumstances.280  In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court held that a 
 
 274. Id. cmt. h (“Some reasonable proportion is also to be maintained between the event or activity 
that makes the individual a public figure and the private facts to which publicity is given.  Revelations 
that may properly be made concerning a murderer or the President of the United States would not be 
privileged if they were to be made concerning one who is merely injured in an automobile accident.”). 
 275. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494–96 (1975). 
 276. Okla. Pub. Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977). 
 277. Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). 
 278. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
 279. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841–42 (1978). 
 280. See supra notes 125–129, 160–161 and accompanying text. 
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shock jock was not liable for airing an illegally recorded conversation because the 
recording contained matters of public concern and the defendants were not involved 
in the conversation’s recording.281  Similarly, Texas may not be able to hold a 
journalist who aired drone footage obtained illegally under Texas law liable if the 
journalist was not involved in the drone operation and the footage was newsworthy.  
This would not weigh on the applicability of the statute against a journalist who 
participated in the operation. 
Second, state and local laws forbidding trespass on private property by a drone 
may similarly be unconstitutional as applied to drone journalism.282  Although the 
Supreme Court has not considered an analogous case, lower courts have barred 
recovery for trespass when an undercover reporter did not possess a duty of loyalty 
to an employer.283  While the doctrine is unclear, the newsworthiness of disclosure 
could also operate as a bar against a trespass suit in that factual scenario. 
Finally, California’s statute granting qualified immunity to emergency responders 
for destroying a drone in the course of an emergency response may also be 
unconstitutional as applied to certain limited factual scenarios.284  Although the 
definition seems to limit the qualified immunity to emergency medical services, 
firefighting, and search and rescue services, to the extent that this qualified immunity 
grant interfered with the First Amendment right to record police during a law 
enforcement encounter, it could be unconstitutional.285 
State and local governments have the ability to regulate drones to preserve the 
privacy of their citizens.  However, they should be conscious of the problems that 
broad privacy regulations can cause for journalists and publications who are moving 
forward with newsworthy facts discovered by drone journalism or footage that might 
incidentally capture private details.  Therefore, these governments should draw on 
the balancing of privacy and newsgathering at common and constitutional law and 
allow a newsgathering defense or require an element of non-newsworthiness in their 
drone “surveillance” statutes.  If they do not properly accommodate drone 
journalism, their statutes run the risk of being struck down as unconstitutional. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the spirit of a law school exam hypothetical, let’s imagine an aspiring drone 
 
 281. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 282. See supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text. 
 283. Compare Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (barring trespass suit by 
dental practice where undercover reporters posed as patients) with Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, 
Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (allowing trespass suit where undercover reporters became grocery 
store employees to investigate grocery store).  At the same time, the case of drones might be more 
analogous to Dietmann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971), where journalists trespassed by gaining 
access to the office portion of plaintiff’s home.  However, as drones proliferate, they might be more 
analogous to Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999), where a covert recording of an office 
phone call was not a tortious invasion of privacy because an office worker lacks a complete expectation 
of privacy in workplace conversations.  See also W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189, 1196 
(10th Cir. 2017). 
 284. See supra notes 153–154 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra notes 171–178 and accompanying text. 
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journalist named Rita Skeeter.286  After a successful career as a tabloid journalist in 
the United Kingdom, self-described as having a “savage quill [which] has punctured 
many inflated reputations,”287 Skeeter has decided to change her beat.  She has 
moved to the United States and wants to cover the 2020 presidential election using a 
drone to capture video for TheDailyProphet.com.  She believes her experience as a 
gossip columnist has prepared her well for the campaign trail. 
In the current regulatory environment, Skeeter would have to go through the 
following steps to lawfully operate a drone for journalistic purposes.  First, after 
buying her drone, she must register it with the FAA.  Next, because the FAA 
considers photography for journalism to be a commercial use of a drone, she must 
follow the FAA’s commercial drone rules.  Assuming Skeeter does not possess a 
pilot’s license, she must pass a test that demonstrates she possesses the knowledge 
required for safe operation of a commercial drone.  Through this test, she will learn 
about the limitations the FAA places on how she can operate her drone, like how 
high she can fly, that she can’t fly over people or at night, and that she or a third-
party visual observer must keep the drone within their line of sight when flying.  
During this process, she might decide to apply for a waiver for one of the FAA’s 
safety limitations.  She’ll hopefully hear from the FAA within 90 days whether her 
waiver request is approved.  She will also have to monitor whether the FAA places 
additional limitations on commercial drone flight or whether the FAA relaxes 
preexisting requirements.  If she determines that a planned flight flies within five 
miles of an airport, she will need to apply for authorization for her specific operation. 
Even if she diligently complies with all of the FAA’s safety regulations, she might 
be subject to additional safety regulations imposed by state and local governments in 
excess of, or even in contradiction of, FAA safety regulations.  As she travels across 
the United States in pursuit of the candidate to whom she is assigned, she will have 
to search through state statute books and municipal ordinances to determine whether 
the locality she is in imposes additional safety constrains.  She also must consider 
special event restrictions.  Even if she diligently complies with this complicated 
thicket of safety regulations, she will also need to consider broadly-worded state and 
 
 286. A character in the Harry Potter series, Daily Prophet reporter Rita Skeeter flits around the 
fourth book revealing gossipy details from the grounds of Hogwarts Castle.  One notable scoop was that 
the Hogwarts gamekeeper Rubeus Hagrid’s mother was the famed giantess Fridwulfa.  J.K. ROWLING, 
HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE 437–40 (2000).  Despite being banned from the wizarding 
boarding school, Skeeter manages to unearth these scoops by turning herself into a beetle and flying 
around the grounds.  See id. at 727–28.  Through a difficult process that few wizards are able to 
accomplish, Skeeter can turn herself into a beetle at will as an “Animagus.”  Id.  Similarly to the FAA’s 
approach with drones, the Ministry of Magic maintains an “Animagus Registry” and any wizard with the 
ability must report the animal they turn into and any distinguishing markings.  See Unregistered Animagi 
from Rita Skeeter to Peter Pettigrew, POTTERMORE, https://perma.cc/3LJG-AQJZ (last visited Feb. 28, 
2019).  The Registry serves dual purposes:  to put wizarding society on notice that an animal may actually 
be a person (this rationale protects wizarding privacy), and to protect the safety of an individual attempting 
the difficult venture of transforming.  See id; see also Everything You Didn’t Know About Animagi, 
POTTERMORE, https://perma.cc/44A5-GQXP (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).  In this hypothetical, Skeeter has 
learned her lesson after failing to register as an Animagus and intends to comply with the United States’ 
federal, state, and local laws regulating drone journalism. 
 287.  ROWLING, supra note 286, at 304. 
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local privacy regulations that could penalize her legitimate journalism.  Although the 
safety and privacy of their citizens are important state regulatory interests, this 
complicated scheme makes it difficult for Skeeter to use her drone for journalism in 
compliance with all applicable laws. She may even need to hire a lawyer to ensure 
compliance. 
The analysis and proposals contained herein would trim the regulatory thicket that 
Skeeter faces.  Skeeter would have to comply with the current FAA commercial 
drone safety regime.  However, she would not need to worry about contradictory 
state and local safety regulations.  To the extent that local governments impose 
special event restrictions, those should put Skeeter on notice of a restriction and, if 
Skeeter possesses an FAA waiver like a waiver to fly over people, the special event 
restriction should accommodate that waiver.  Skeeter would also be able to avail 
herself of her status as a news media representative to obtain a fee waiver and 
expedited processing of her waiver request from the FAA. 
Federal preemption of state and local safety regulations would significantly 
reduce the complexity of safety regulations with which Skeeter must comply.  While 
explicit Congressional preemption of state and local safety regulations would best 
indicate to Skeeter that she must only pay attention to the FAA’s drone safety 
regulations, the current FAA framework already implicitly preempts state and local 
safety regulations and could similarly assure Skeeter.  As discussed, preemption does 
not extend to state and local privacy laws and state privacy tort actions, so Skeeter 
will need to remain abreast of these laws.  For the most part, the newsworthiness of 
her photography, and the Supreme Court’s precedents balancing privacy and 
newsgathering should guide how she conducts her journalism.  However, the First 
Amendment restrains several state and local privacy statutes:  Newsgathering 
justifies trespass in the absence of a breach of loyalty, Skeeter may publish 
unlawfully recorded footage lawfully obtained from an anonymous source, and 
Skeeter may recover from some instances of emergency response personnel 
destroying her drone based on the right to record.  Although this system is still vague, 
it provides clearer rules and better accommodates Skeeter’s use of a drone to conduct 
journalism. 
Commercial drones have the potential to be powerful new tools for content 
production and investigative reporting.  In a short span of time, safety regulations 
have become increasingly more permissive of commercial drone use as the FAA 
considers how best to integrate commercial drones into the federal airspace system.  
As these regulations become more relaxed, the entire federal, state, and local 
regulatory scheme must become simpler too, to allow journalists to use these tools 
without fear of civil and criminal penalties.  To be sure, governments have interests 
in protecting the safety, privacy, and other regional or region-specific interests of 
their citizens.  But they must do it in a way that also accommodates the legitimate 
use of drones as a tool for journalism. 
 
